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Abstract 
In Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
Congress adopted four wide-ranging reforms to the Department of Defense (DoD) 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology 
Transfer (STTR) programs in order to increase their effectiveness for both the DoD 
and the defense industry. First, Section 252 directed closer alignment between R&D 
and acquisition goals of SBIR and STTR.  Second, Section 252 authorized and 
funded the creation of the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) by the DoD and 
the military Departments to facilitate transition of SBIR technologies into the 
acquisition process.  Congress conditioned the use of CPP funds on detailed 
evaluative reporting to Congress.  Third, Congress codified into statutory law 
President George W. Bush’s Executive Order No. 13329 (2004), which incentivized 
manufacturing technologies through SBIR and STTR.  Fourth, Congress clarified 
agencies’ authority to conduct testing and evaluation (T&E) of SBIR and STTR 
technologies in SBIR and STTR Phases II and III.  The implementation requirements 
were specified in Section 252 and the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) issued 
by the House and the Senate Small Business Committees. 
This study analyzes the implementation of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) by the 
secretaries of Defense, of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force based on a 
literature review, a survey of SBIR and STTR program executives, and comparison 
with similar British initiatives.  The study questions are based on Section 252 text 
and the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) as well as on best practices identified 
in relevant academic and professional literature. The study finds that although the 
DoD and the military departments have begun implementation of the DoD SBIR CPP 
and other Section 252 reforms, progress is uneven.  Specifically, agencies are not 
implementing Section 252 CPP incentives and R&D alignment requirements to the 
fullest extent possible.  The study recommends clarifications of legislative 
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I. Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) spends close to $1.5 billion a year on 
competitive research and development (R&D) set-asides under the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) and the Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) 
programs, established under 15 U.S.C. § 638.  These competitive set-asides are 
designed to help small firms investigate ideas for new technologies (Phase I) and 
develop prototypes (Phase II).  Congress intended that new technologies will be 
commercialized either through the federal procurement process or in private 
markets.  To encourage return on SBIR and STTR investment, Congress directed 
federal agencies to purchase products and services developed through SBIR and 
STTR to the maximum extent practicable and authorized government agencies to 
buy SBIR and STTR technologies from SBIR and STTR awardees (or their 
successor firms) on a sole-source basis.  In recent years, however, both Congress 
and industry have grown increasingly frustrated with the low utilization of SBIR- and 
STTR-developed technologies in DoD acquisition, especially in major defense 
acquisition programs. 
In Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, 
entitled Research and Development Efforts for Purposes of Small Business 
Research, Congress adopted four wide-ranging reforms to the DoD SBIR and STTR 
programs in order to increase the effectiveness of SBIR and STTR for both the DoD 
and the defense industry. First, Section 252 directed closer alignment between R&D 
and acquisition goals of SBIR and STTR.  Second, Section 252 authorized and 
funded the creation of the Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP) by the DoD and 
the military Departments to facilitate transition of SBIR technologies into the 
acquisition process.  Congress conditioned the use of CPP funds on detailed 
evaluative reporting to Congress.  Third, Congress codified into statutory law 
President George W. Bush’s Executive Order No. 13329 (2004), entitled 
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technologies through the SBIR and STTR programs.  Fourth, Congress clarified the 
authority to conduct testing and evaluation (T&E) of SBIR and STTR technologies in 
SBIR and STTR Phases II and III.  The implementation requirements were specified 
in the text of Section 252 and the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) issued by 
the leadership of the House and the Senate Small Business Committees.   
In response, on June 27, 2006, then-Under Secretary Kenneth Krieg issued a 
Memorandum to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force directing them to 
implement the CPP authority:   
The purpose of the CPP is to accelerate the transition of SBIR-funded 
technologies to Phase III – specifically into systems being developed, 
acquired and maintained for the warfighter. This can be done through 
activities that enhance the connectivity among SBIR firms, prime contractors, 
and DoD science & technology and acquisition communities. It can also be 
accomplished by improving an SBIR firm’s capability to provide the identified 
technology to the Department, directly or as a subcontractor.  Since 
leveraging the SBIR program to meet identified technology needs is a goal of 
the Department, I request that you develop a CPP utilizing this new authority. 
(Krieg, 2006). 
Subsequently, the DoD prepared four legislatively mandated annual reports to 
Congress addressing Section 252, but apparently stopped publishing such reports 
despite the statutory requirement to do so after the much-delayed Fiscal Year 2009 
report published in the calendar year 2011 (OUSD AT&L OSBP 2007, 2008, 2009, 
and 2011). Further, the reports already published did not appear to fully cover all the 
details which the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) intended for DoD and 
military departments to address as part of Section 252 implementation.  Therefore, a 
more detailed research into the implementation of Congressional intent was 
necessary.  
This paper analyzes the implementation of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) by the 
Secretaries of Defense, of the Army, of the Navy, and of the Air Force.  It reflects the 
results of a literature review and a survey of SBIR and STTR program executives.  
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Letter (2006).  Study questions also rely on best practices identified in relevant 
academic and professional literature, in innovation programs of other federal 
agencies such as the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and 
in practices of our major North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partner, the 
United Kingdom’s Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI). The study finds that 
while the DoD and the military departments have begun implementation of the DoD 
SBIR CPP and other Section 252 reforms, progress is uneven.  Specifically, 
agencies are not implementing Section 252 CPP incentives and R&D alignment 
requirements to the fullest extent possible.  The study recommends clarifications of 
legislative requirements and additional review of Section 252 implementation. 
Section II of this report gives general background information about SBIR and 
STTR. The section describes the programs’ objectives. It also describes firms’ 
eligibility requirements to participate in each program. A list of participating 
government agencies is also included in this section. A description of each of the 
three phases for the programs is given at the end of this section.   Neither Section II 
nor this study generally address the recent changes which Congress made to the 
SBIR and STTR Programs and the DoD Commercialization Pilot Program (now 
renamed the Commercial Readiness Program (CRP)) (NDAA, 2011).  However, 
lessons from this study should inform implementation of these recent improvements.   
Section III delves into the specific background of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006), 
including details from a National Academy of Sciences symposium report entitled 
SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of Commercialization. Following that symposium, 
“the Senate Committee on Small Business & Entrepreneurship proposed legislation 
that called for a commercialization pilot program” (NAS, 2007, p. 29, Footnote 23). 
The purpose of this section is to give the reader an idea of the SBIR and STTR 
program conditions prior to Section 252 by putting Section 252 reforms in context. 
After reading this section, the reader should understand the reasons that Congress 
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As part of this paper, Messrs. Hettinger and Gonzalez under the guidance of 
Dr. Kidalov conducted a survey, directed primarily at SBIR and STTR program 
managers and administrators within DoD agencies and military departments, that 
attempted to ascertain how Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) has been carried out within 
these specific agencies. The Survey Methodology section describes in detail the 
methods we used, clearly states the survey questions that were given to 
participants, and describes limitations identified by the survey administrators. 
The Analysis section of the paper describes results from this survey. We 
analyzed and compared all of the respondents’ answers for each question with the 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) legislation, the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006), as 
well as with additional sources. The survey answers, in many cases, showed 
inconsistencies with the intent of the legislation as well as with announced practices. 
Finally, this paper analyzes the counterpart program, namely, the United 
Kingdom’s Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) as implemented by the Center 
for Defence Enterprise (CDE) and the Technology Strategy Board (TSB).  
The paper concludes with answers to the research questions and the authors’ 
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II. Background of the SBIR and STTR 
Programs 
The DoD SBIR program awards contracts to qualifying small businesses that 
display the promise of producing cutting-edge technology for military or dual-use 
applications.  The technology may show promise, but that technology may still be 
too risky for private investment due to various reasons such as a relatively low 
technological readiness level and no past performance history for the company 
(NAS, 2007). Therefore, an SBIR contract can act as initial funding to get an idea 
developed into a product or service. The SBIR program began pursuant to the Small 
Business Innovation Act of 1982. The STTR program began pursuant to the Small 
Business Technology Transfer Act of 1992. SBIR and STTR have no permanent 
reauthorization but have been periodically reauthorized since then. The main 
difference between SBIR and STTR is that SBIR contracts are open solely to small 
businesses—defined as businesses with less than 500 employees—and STTR 
contracts are open to small businesses that collaborate with not-for-profit research 
organizations such as universities and federally funded R&D centers (SBIR and 
STTR Policy Directives, 2002). 
As stated in the Small Business Innovation Act (1982), the SBIR and STTR 
programs have four goals:  
1. stimulate technological innovation, 
2. use small business to meet federal and development needs, 
3. foster and encourage participation by minority and disadvantaged 
persons in technological innovation, and  
4. increase private-sector commercialization derived from federal R&D.  
(p. 1) 
The forth objective, commercialization, is defined by the U.S. Small Business 
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producing and delivering products or services for sale (whether by the originating 
party or by others) to Government or commercial markets” (SBIR and STTR Policy 
Directives, 2002). 
Federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets of at least $100 million are 
required to participate in SBIR.  Federal agencies with extramural R&D budgets of at 
least $1 billion are required to participate in STTR.  Participating agencies are 
required to set aside 2.5% and 0.3% of their R&D budgets for SBIR and STTR 
programs, respectively (15 U.S.C. § 638).  Within the DoD, each military department 
as well as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the 
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) administer their own SBIR/STTR programs.  Seven 
agencies under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) administer the SBIR 
programs but not STTR; these agencies include the Defense Logistics Agency 
(DLA), the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA), the Defense Technical 
Information Center (DTIC), the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), the 
Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP), the Special Operations 
Acquisitions and Logistics Center (SOALC), and the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency (NGIA). 
The DoD SBIR/STTR awards processes are divided into three phases.  In 
Phase I, small businesses compete on SBIR/STTR topics that are published by the 
DoD.  The DoD announces SBIR topics three times a year and STTR topics twice a 
year.  Small businesses that earn Phase I contracts can generally be awarded up to 
$150,000 (SBA 2010) while participating in SBIR and up to $100,000 while 
participating in STTR (SBIR and STTR Policy Directives, 2002). The purpose of 
Phase I is “for determining, insofar as possible, the scientific and technical merit and 
feasibility of ideas that appear to have commercial potential, as described in 
subparagraph (B), submitted pursuant to SBIR program solicitations” (15 U.S.C. § 
638).  Phase I awardees can be awarded up to $1 million for SBIR and $750,000 for 
STTR in a Phase II contract. The purpose of Phase II is “to further develop proposed 
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the scientific, technical, and commercial merit and feasibility of the idea, as 
evidenced by the first phase and by other relevant information” (15 U.S.C. § 638). 
Phase III is considered the commercialization phase. This is the step in which 
only non-SBIR/non-STTR funds, typically from private-sector investment or other 
Federal funds such as defense acquisition program funds, can be used to develop 
an actual product or service. In some cases, enough work can be completed in 
Phase I or II to satisfy a defense acquisition program office.  According to the DoD 
SBIR/STTR Desk Reference, “Phase III refers to work that derives from, extends, or 
logically concludes effort(s) performed under prior SBIR funding agreements, but is 
funded by sources other than the SBIR Program. Phase III work is typically oriented 
towards commercialization of SBIR research or technology” . . . but may also include 
continuation of R&D.  (DoD SBIR Program Office, n.d., p. 112). “Phase III work may 
be for products, production, services, R/ R&D, or any combination thereof.”  (DoD 
SBIR Program Office, n.d., p. 112).  Phase III projects are subject to a special 
preference at the prime contracting and subcontracting levels in favor of SBIR/STTR 
Phase II awardee (or successor in interest):  
For Phase III, Congress intends that agencies or their Government-owned, 
contractor-operated facilities, Federally-funded research and development 
centers, or Government prime contractors that pursue R/R&D or production 
developed under the SBIR Program, give preference, including sole source 
awards, to the awardee that developed the technology. In fact, the Act 
requires reporting to SBA of all instances in which an agency pursues 
research, development, or production of a technology developed by an SBIR 
awardee, with a concern other than the one that developed the SBIR 
technology. (DoD SBIR Program Office, n.d., p. 113). 
However, as acknowledged by the National Research Council of the National 
Academies, SBIR firms seeking to sell to the Federal government face significant 
challenges during the course of the Phase III commercialization process.  Indeed, 
before small firms can sell their technologies through the regular government 
procurement process, they often lack capital and go through a “valley of death”-type 
experience where they lack capital to convert their R&D into marketable products or 
services.  (NAS, 2007, pp. 5–6).   The term “valley of death” defines “this challenging 
transition when a developing technology is deemed promising, but too new to 
validate its commercial potential and thereby attract the capital necessary for its 
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specific transition challenges for SBIR innovations, including barriers to entry into the 
procurement process:    
Commercializing SBIR-supported innovation is necessary if the nation is to 
capitalize on its SBIR investments. This transition is, however, challenging 
because it requires a small firm with an innovative idea to evolve quickly from 
a narrow focus on R&D to a much broader understanding of the complex 
systems and missions of federal agencies as well as the interrelated 
challenges of managing a larger business, developing sources of finance, and 
competing in the marketplace.  In cases where the federal government is the 
customer, small businesses must also learn to deal with a complex 
contracting system characterized by many arcane rules and procedures. . . . 
The challenge of technology commercialization includes the normal 
uncertainties of the development process common to all new technologies as 
well as unique institutional challenges found in federal procurement practices. 
Commercializing science-based innovations is inherently a high-risk 
endeavor. One source of risk is the lack of sufficient public information for 
potential investors about technologies developed by small firms.  A second 
related hurdle is the leakage of new knowledge that escapes the boundaries 
of firms and intellectual property protection. The creator of new knowledge 
can seldom fully capture the economic value of that knowledge for his or her 
own firm.  . . . Commercializing SBIR-funded technologies though federal 
procurement is no less challenging for innovative small companies. Finding 
private sources of funding to further develop even successful SBIR Phase II 
projects . . .is often difficult because the eventual “market” for products is 
unlikely to be large enough to attract private venture funding. . . . Institutional 
biases in federal procurement also hinder government funding needed to 
transition promising SBIR technologies. Procurement rules and practices 
often impose high costs and administrative overheads that favor established 
suppliers. In addition, many acquisition officers have traditionally viewed the 
SBIR program as a “tax’ on their R&D budgets, representing a “loss” of 
resources and control rather than an opportunity to develop rapid and lower 
cost solutions to complex procurement challenges. Even when they see the 
value of a technology, providing “extra” funding to exploit it in a timely manner 
can be a challenge that requires time, commitment, and, ultimately, the 
interest of those with budgetary authority for the programs or systems. 
Attracting such interest and support is not automatic and may often depend 
on personal relations and advocacy skills, not on the intrinsic quality of the 
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III. Background of Section 252 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006 
The purpose of Section 252 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2006 was to reform SBIR and STTR. Section 252 mostly addresses 
issues within the SBIR program but does refer to STTR. At the time, the U.S. House 
and Senate Small Business Committees became concerned with the state of SBIR 
and STTR because they believed that DoD was not adequately leveraging the 
innovation of small businesses even though such innovation is vital for the U.S.’s 
national security.  Both Congressional Small Business Committees also view Phase 
I and Phase II contract awards as investments of taxpayer dollars. Attempting to 
reform SBIR and STTR Section 252 added the following subsections to Section 9 of 
the Small Business Act:  
 Subsection (x): Research and Development Focus;  
 Subsection (y): Commercialization Pilot Program, language concerning 
implementation of Executive Order No. 13329 (2004); and  
 Subsection (e)(9): language supporting testing and evaluation of SBIR 
and STTR technologies.   
Each of these subsections is meant to address challenges that have been 
identified within the SBIR and STTR communities by the National Academies of 
Sciences 2005 Symposium on SBIR commercialization and other inputs from 
government and industry.  These challenges include SBIR and STTR topic 
alignment, expediting the commercialization of SBIR and STTR projects, and 
assurance that Executive Order No. 13329, Encouraging Innovation in 
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A. Reform 1: SBIR Topics Generation 
Subsection (x) Research and Development Focus mandates that the 
Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) will engage in a Quadrennial SBIR/STTR Review in 
order to revise and update the criteria and procedures utilized to identify R&D efforts 
that are suitable for SBIR and STTR programs at least once every four years. 
According to the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006), subsection (x) “addresses 
the need for a strategic, DoD-wide review of the SBIR and STTR program 
(conducted not less than quadrennially) based on the latest research, science, and 
technology plans of the DoD” and based on the Joint Warfighting Science and 
Technology Plan, the Defense Technology Area Plan, and the Basic Research Plan. 
Together, these plans represent the foundation of the Defense Science and 
Technology Strategy, while each of these plans has a specific emphasis: joint 
warfighter operations, DoD-wide acquisition program priorities, and strategically 
disruptive/revolutionary technologies, respectively.  (DoD and JCS, 2006).  
Together, these plans were to focus R&D efforts within the DoD SBIR and STTR to 
specific areas previously identified to be of strategic importance to warfighting 
efforts. At the same time, Subsection (x) also mandates that program managers and 
program executive officers be included during topic generation. If an SBIR/STTR 
project is not aligned with an acquisition program to fill in technological gaps, then it 
is unlikely to attract those kinds of funds.  Therefore, early involvement from program 
offices is essential. 
B. Reform 2: The Commercialization Pilot Program 
Next, Subsection (y) authorizes the Secretary of Defense and each military 
department secretary to create a CPP.  The CPP’s stated intent is to “accelerate the 
transition of SBIR technologies into Phase III including acquisition process.”  (NDAA 
2006). If a department decides to create a CPP, then the department must adhere to 
all the requirements within Subsection (y).  These requirements include that the 
Secretary of Defense and the secretary of each military department must identify 
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writing that the identified projects will meet high priorities within that military Service.  
Each military department is authorized to use up to 1% of available SBIR funds to 
administer the CPP, but these CPP administrative funds cannot be used to award 
Phase III contracts.  Subsection (y) also mandates that the Secretary of Defense 
provide an evaluative report to (1) the Committee on Armed Services and the 
Committee on Small Business and Entrepreneurship of the Senate and (2) the 
Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Small Business of the House 
of Representatives.  This report must contain an accounting of funds, a description 
of incentives and activities performed under the CPP, and results achieved under 
the CPP. 
The origin of the CPP came from the 2005 National Academy of Sciences 
SBIR Transition Symposium.  This symposium was a gathering of leadership from 
government agencies, large defense contractors (prime contractors), and small 
businesses.  During the Symposium, representatives from each of these sectors 
discussed challenges of commercialization from their own point of view.  Policy 
reform recommendations at the symposium generally fell within two categories: “(1) 
possible changes in agency program management, including better use of incentives 
for managers, roadmaps, and greater matchmaking, and (2) ways in which small 
businesses and the prime contractors could better align their work to improve Phase 
III outcomes” (NAS, 2007, p. 23). 
With regards to incentives for better defense acquisition program 
management with regards to SBIR transition, Symposium proceedings focused on 
finding best ways to incentivize program managers (PMs) and program executive 
officers (PEOs) on major defense acquisition programs to introduce new 
technologies that can not only result in substantial time, cost, or performance 
benefits, but also can present some risk of disruption to program costs and 
schedules if the technologies failed. Leading government officials, industry 
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management.  For example, during the Symposium, incentives were proposed in the 
following areas: 
 Alignment. Entering the SBIR company into a program with which the 
program executive officer was already engaged is one way to better 
focus SBIR projects on outcomes that directly support agency 
programs’ (and program officer) objectives. As noted by some 
speakers, this could allow SBIR projects to connect with Phase III 
activities already under way. 
 Reliability. This involves identifying technologies that have been 
operationally tested and need little, if any, modification. This 
suggestion by a participant reflected widely held views that program 
executive officer involvement was critical in bringing SBIR technologies 
to the necessary readiness level. 
 Capacity. As Dr. Michael McGrath, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development, Testing, and Evaluation, noted, 
SBIR firms need to take steps to convince program executive officers 
not only that the SBIR technology works but also that small business 
will be able to produce it to scale and on time. 
 Budget Integration. Some participants noted that program executive 
officers needed to see that the SBIR set-aside will be used to further 
their own missions. This calls for building SBIR research into the work 
and budget of program offices. By contrast, the Air Force’s program 
offices submit a budget based on independent cost estimates. SBIR 
awards are then taken as a 2.5% tax out of that budget.  
 Training. [Colonel Mark D. Stephen, Chief, Science & Technology 
Division, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
Science, Technology, and Engineering (DASAF (ST&E)] noted that 
training program executive officers to help them understand how SBIR 
can be leveraged to realize their mission goals is necessary. However, 
Mr. [Richard] Carroll of Innovative Defense Strategies [and past 
Chairman of the Small Business Technology Council] noted that SBIR 
training had been part of the general program executive officer training 
curriculum for one year but had since been deleted. 
 Partnering. As described by Carl Ray, [NASA Program Executive for 
SBIR and STTR], the SBIR program at NASA is forming partnerships 
with mission directorates aimed at enhancing “spin-in” — the take-up 
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 Emphasizing Opportunity. McGrath noted that the Navy’s SBIR 
management attempts to provide a consistent message to program 
executive officers and program managers—that “SBIR provides money 
and opportunity to fill R&D gaps in the program. Apply that money and 
innovation to your most urgent needs” (NAS, 2007, pp. 23–24). 
With respect to the road maps, “some participants emphasized the need to 
coordinate small business activities with prime contractor project roadmaps.” NAS, 
2007, p. 24). This is due to the complexities involved in integrating SBIR-funded 
candidate subsystems into large weapons systems in which prime contractors act as 
lead integrators.  Large prime contractor representatives offered the following 
perspectives: 
Lockheed’s Mr. [Mario] Ramirez[, F-35/Joint Strike Fighter Small Business 
Officer for Lockheed Martin Aeronautics,] noted that “to make successful 
transitions to Phase III, SBIR technologies must be integrated into an overall 
roadmap.” Lockheed Martin uses a variety of roadmaps to that end, including 
both technical capability roadmaps and corporate technology roadmaps. The 
Raytheon representative [John Waszczak, Director of Advanced Technology 
and SBIR/STTR for Raytheon Missile Systems.] added that roadmaps are 
important because it is necessary to coordinate the technology transition 
process across the customer, the supply chain, and small businesses. 
Coordination should include advanced technology demonstrations, which 
could be used to integrate multiple technologies into a complex system. 
(NAS, 2007, pp. 24–25) 
Ultimately, all symposium participants agreed that the transition to 
commercialization needed to be reformed. SBIR technologies needed buy-in from 
program managers and prime contractors and the attitude of SBIR being a “tax” on 
acquisition and R&D program funding needed to change.  Statements at the NAS 
Symposium provided examples of incentive strategies needed to effect such a 
change.  Robert McNamara of the Navy, Program Executive Officer - Submarines, 
described himself as an advocate of small business and said that the centerpiece of 
his advocacy was the SBIR program. In his Requests for Proposals (RFPs), 
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For example, McNamara contracted with General Dynamics on the Virginia-
class acquisition program, demonstrating that small businesses are a high priority, 
and offered a million-dollar “bounty” per hull as an additional incentive fee for 
contractors who met small business subcontracting goals. The Navy owes it to the 
large prime contractors, he said, to provide real incentives for a policy considered 
truly important (NAS, 2007, p. 142). 
Col. Stephen of the U.S. Air Force DASAF (ST&E) suggested that in order to 
gain buy-in, the SBIR program should be sure to focus not only on research but also 
on the results that program managers need—outputs that directly support agency 
objectives. Dr. John Parmentola, Director of Research and Laboratory Management, 
U.S. Army, agreed, saying that program managers want technologies that have 
been operationally tested and require little, if any, modification. Section 252 (NDAA, 
2006) makes provisions for testing and evaluation (T&E).  Opening the SBIR 
program to T&E is an incentive for program managers because results from T&E 
may be used to gauge the technology readiness level (TRL) of a SBIR project.  As 
stated by Symposium participants, the TRL is more important to program managers 
than ongoing research. 
This need for meaningful incentives was also reiterated by prime contractors.  
Prime contractors represented at the symposium stated that they have focused 
management attention, shifted resources, and assigned responsibilities within their 
own management structures to capitalize on the creativity of SBIR firms and 
promote greater T&E (NAS, 2007, p. 28). Lockheed Martin also intended to build 
more formal business relationships with its small businesses, which are critical to 
successful Phase III transitions. This process must begin with joint visits to 
customers, when both sides can discuss product discriminators, areas for further 
investigation, and collaboration within Lockheed’s own Independent Research and 
Development (IR&D) and Cooperative Research and Development Agreement 
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technologies and firms and allow Lockheed to demonstrate its successes and build 
formal partnerships. 
During the Symposium, one of the authors of this paper, Dr. Max Kidalov, 
then serving as Counsel at the Senate Small Business Committee, lead a panel 
discussion on incentives for contracting with SBIR firms. Kidalov noted that in his 
experience, large prime contractors needed a champion, a corporate strategy, and 
incentives to continue using SBIR firms. He noted that these incentives need to go 
beyond the competitive advantages they provide. Kidalov asked whether the 
panelists saw value in a system that would allow for recognition of efforts to contract 
with SBIR firms, perhaps from Congress and the government agencies. All panelists 
agreed. 
Specifically, in response, Boeing representative [Richard Hendel, Principal 
Specialist, Enterprise Supplier Diversity Program Office and SBIR Manager, The 
Boeing Company,] pointed out that incentives are built into contracts when agencies 
award them for many reasons, such as schedule and budget. The Boeing 
representative was pointing out that it should be possible to include similar 
incentives, such as those for working with SBIR firms. An ATK representative agreed 
that incentives were essential because primes, like government program managers, 
were risk adverse by nature. Incentives would encourage them to take those risks. 
The Raytheon representative was more specific in response to the question 
posed by Dr. Kidalov. In particular, Mr. Wasczak stated three incentives that would 
help the case to use SBIR firms: First, to streamline and otherwise optimize the 
SBIR process, which in turn would ensure the development of many technologies 
needed for the long term; second, an assurance that customers have realistic plans 
to support the transition from Phase II through Phase III; third, an incentive that 
SBIR firms help meet the requirement to work with small, disadvantaged businesses 
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C. Reform 3: Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) mandates the full implementation of the tenets of 
Executive Order No. 13329, Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing (2004). The 
impact of Section 252 is that future Presidential administrations cannot ignore this 
order.  Executive Order No. 13329 was issued on February 24, 2004, by President 
George W. Bush. The goal of the order is outlined in the Introduction section, which 
stresses the importance of the federal government’s role in encouraging 
technological innovation in the U.S. economy. As part of that encouragement, the 
order specifically tasks the SBIR and SBTT programs with “helping to advance 
innovation, including innovation in manufacturing, through small businesses” 
(Executive Order No. 13329, 2004, § 1). The Executive Order required that heads of 
departments and agencies that have an SBIR or STTR program “give high priority 
within such programs to manufacturing-related research and development” 
(Executive Order No. 13329, 2004, § 2). The order places on department and 
agency heads a requirement to provide an annual report to the Small Business 
Administration and to the Director of the White House Office of Science and 
Technology Policy in which they are to report on their efforts in meeting this order. 
An impact of the executive order issuance was that the U.S. Small Business 
Administration proposed amendments to the SBIR Policy Directive on May 19, 2005, 
to incorporate the goals of Executive Order 13329.  (SBA, 2005). Although the 
amendments to the SBIR Policy Directive were not finalized, many agencies 
themselves established their own implementation plans.  
D. Reform 4: Enhanced Testing & Evaluation 
In order to address another issue that impairs SBIR projects from transitioning 
to Phase III, Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) clarifies the definition of what constitutes a 
commercial application. The clarification was necessary in order to remove barriers 
imposed by overly restrictive interpretations of Phase II and Phase III requirements.  
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U.S.C. § 638 (2006) was expanded to include T&E of products, services, or 
technologies for use in technical or weapons systems, and, further, awards for T&E 
of products, services, or technologies for use in technical or weapons systems may 
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IV. Survey Methodology 
A. Survey Goals 
In order to access effectiveness of Congressional SBIR/STTR reforms in 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006), we designed a survey and sought answers from 
program managers and experts within the military departments who are involved 
with the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program. We asked 102 
individuals to complete an online survey. Our purpose in using the survey was to 
document the agency implementations and practice in regard to the 
Commercialization Pilot Program and other Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) reforms. With 
this information, it was then possible to identify what was being done to implement 
Section 252 and how each agency worked to meet the congressional intent of the 
CPP. 
B. Survey Design 
The survey focuses on seven main research questions from the 
Congressional Guidance Letter to Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) Kenneth J. Krieg. 
1. How did the DoD implement the new requirement in Section 252(a) 
(NDAA, 2006) for research focus of its SBIR and STTR programs? 
2. How did the DoD and each military department plan to involve 
acquisition program managers and program executive offices in 
SBIR/STTR topic selection and management to ensure that 
SBIR/STTR is integrated into the DoD’s mission and its acquisition 
framework, as contemplated in Section 252(a) (NDAA, 2006), SBIR 
Commercialization Pilot Program, and Section 252(c), inclusion of 
testing and evaluation works as part of SBIR/STTR commercialization 
activity? 
3. How did the DoD and each military department’s acquisition program 
managers and program executive officers plan for post-SBIR/-STTR 
funding, through the Program Objective Memoranda and other 
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process, as stated in Section 252(a) (NDAA, 2006), SBIR 
Commercialization Pilot Program? 
4. How did the DoD and each military department plan and implement the 
SBIR Commercialization Pilot Program, and specifically what 
processes did these military [departments] and defense agencies 
develop and implement to ensure identification of optimal SBIR/STTR 
Phase I–II projects for accelerated transition through this pilot 
program? 
5. What acquisition incentives and activities did the DoD and each 
military department deploy to accelerate the transition of SBIR/STTR 
technologies into the acquisition process though the pilot program? 
6. What specific reporting requirements did the DoD and each military 
department impose on acquisition program managers, program 
executive officers, and prime contractors as part of the annual 
evaluative report to Congress, as outlined in Section 252(a) (NDAA, 
2006)? 
7. How did the DoD and each military department implement Executive 
Order No. 13329 (2004), Encouraging Innovation In Manufacturing, 
codified into law as part of Section 252(b) (NDAA, 2006)? 
C. Survey Scoring 
We asked respondents two types of questions: those requiring a positive or 
negative response, and those requesting a response using a rating scale.  We also 
gave respondents the option of choosing don’t know or not applicable. 
D. Survey Subjects 
We asked all DoD agencies and departments participating in SBIR and STTR 
to participate in the survey.  We sent each point of contact an e-mail with a request 
to participate in the survey and a link to the SurveyMonkey.com website where the 
online survey was posted.  To refresh respondents’ recollection, we supplemented 
the survey with the text of the act and a copy of the Congressional Guidance Letter, 
issued jointly by the Chair and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate Committee 
on Small Business and Entrepreneurship and the Chair of the House Committee on 
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their agency. We asked respondents to identify their agency. We did not collect 
respondents’ names or positions within their agency. 
E. Survey Limitations 
The survey was primarily intended to ask responsible agency officials to 
identify practices and polices related to the reforms adopted by Congress and 
outlined in Section 252 (NDAA, 2006).  
The data collected in the survey is therefore the primary source of the 
conclusions presented in this report. No respondent actually completed the survey in 
total. This was partly by design since a large number of the survey questions were 
only presented to the respondent depending on the respondent’s previous answer. 
The conclusions we discuss in the following sections of this paper are based 
on results obtained when multiple responders provided the answers to the questions 
being asked.  Where appropriate or necessary, respondents’ answers were 





















do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 23 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
V. Survey Results and Analysis 
A. Response Rate and Background Results 
1. Background and Participating Organizations 
We asked 102 individuals to complete the online survey. Of those 102 
potential respondents, we received 19 attempted responses, with the largest number 
of participants identified as being from Air Force organizations. 
As noted above, partly as a result of the design of the survey to adjust the 
questions asked depending on the response to previous questions, no one 
participant completed all 30 questions within the survey.  
The responding organizations and their completed response rates (not 
including respondents skipping any given question) are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Response by Organization 
 
   
Invited Participant Organization Participated? Number of 
Responses 
Office of the Secretary of Defense/Office of Small Business Programs No 0 
Army No 0 
Navy Yes 3 
Air Force Yes 4 
Missile Defense Agency No 0 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Yes 1 
Joint Science and Technology Office for Chemical and Biological 
Defense 
No 0 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency No 0 
Defense Microelectronics Activity No 0 
Defense Logistics Agency No 0 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency No 0 
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Science and 
Technology) 
No 0 
U.S. Special Operations Command No 0 
Commercialization Pilot Program Implementing Contractor – Army No 0 
Commercialization Pilot Program Implementing Contractor - Navy No 0 
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B. Organizational Alignment of Regulations, Policies, and 
Procedures With SBIR and STTR Research Focus 
1. Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans 
Given an opportunity to respond to a question regarding the adoption of 
regulations, policies, or procedures necessary for compliance with the requirement 
in Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) for alignment of SBIR and STTR research topics with 
those set forth in the Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan, the Defense 
Technology Area Plan, and the Basis Research Plan of the Department of Defense, 
50% of the respondents for the organization responded that their organization was 
not in alignment with the plan (Figure 1).  Of the respondents, 37.5% gave an 
affirmative response that their organization was in alignment with such plan or plans. 
Of the respondents, 12.5% answered that they did not know if their 
organization had institutionalized SBIR/STTR topic alignment with the Section 252–
identified DoD research plans in their organization. 
When the results are broken down by organization (Figure 2), the Navy 
response indicated that it was more in compliance than any other agency, and the 
Air Force response indicated that it was the least compliant. Overall, all responding 
organizations indicated that they did not have the topic alignment required by 
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 SBIR/STTR Policy Alignment With DoD Research Plans Figure 1.
 
 SBIR/STTR Policy Alignment With DoD Research Plans,  Figure 2.
Response by Organization 
Analysis. These response results are surprising because the Research 
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SBIR/STTR topics in the Air Force (with some exception for space-related systems; 
Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2010, p. 9) and the Army, while the Navy 
approaches topic generation by the program offices (DoD Inspector General 
[DoDIG], 2009). The Army and Air Force labs should be well aware of the defense 
science plans that are required for topic generation and the statutory requirements 
for generating those topics. 
The conclusion that can be drawn from this data is that either the 
organizations are uninformed regarding the statutory alignment requirement or they 
are aware but do not put the requirements in place. Further research would have to 
be conducted to determine which of the two conclusions is correct. 
2. Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans—
Program Manager/Program Executive Officer Input 
With a response of 50%, the plurality of respondents answered not applicable 
to the question as to whether their organizations had in place regulations, policies, or 
procedures to obtain input of program managers and/or program executive officers 
in order to determine the R&D focus areas for SBIR and STTR topics (see Figure 3). 
In contrast, 37.5% of the respondents answered positively that there were 
regulations, policies, or procedures in place to provide input of program managers 
and/or program executive officers, as required by Section 252 (NDAA, 2006). There 
were 12.5% who answered that they did not know.  As shown in Figure 4, Navy and 
Air Force responses showed compliance with Section 252 with regards to program 
manager/program executive officer input.  NGIA responded that this Section 252 
requirement was not applicable, while Air Force respondents also claimed lack of 
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 Program Manager/Program Executive Officer Input Into SBIR/STTR  Figure 3.
Focus Areas 
 
 Program Manager/Program Executive Officer Input Into SBIR/STTR  Figure 4.




Do the regulations, policies, or procedures identified above provide for 
input from Program Managers and/or Program Executive Offices in the 
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Analysis. However much the response of the Navy Department shows its 
understanding of this section of the legislation, the overwhelming response by all 
organizations indicated that the involvement of program managers and program 
executive officers in determining focus areas was not applicable to their SBIR/STTR 
program implementation. 
This finding is also surprising, especially since a 2006 memorandum from the 
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) issued the SBIR policy requiring “at 
least 50% of SBIR topics [to] have acquisition community endorsement or 
sponsorship” (Krieg, 2006). As reported in the DoDIG report of January 30, 2009, 
which related the results of  a Navy 2007 SBIR symposium, it was noted that the 
Navy writes SBIR topics that are closely aligned with the needs of the acquisition 
community for easier transitions of technology projects. As a result, Navy topics are 
less risky, and they transition to commercialization (Phase III) more easily then the 
topics developed by other means (DoDIG, 2009, p. 9). In addition to the success 
reported by the Navy, involvement of the acquisition community in topic generation 
was also recommended as a best practice in a Congressionally mandated SBIR 
study conducted by the National Academy of Sciences (2009). 
As was also noted in the DoDIG report, this requirement for involving the 
acquisition community members in the development of topics for SBIR/STTR 
projects may pose a problem for DARPA because their focus is not on “urgent needs 
and requirements” but rather on “radical innovations that may take years to prove 
feasible” (DoDIG, 2009, p. 10). Consequently, an area of further research may be 
how an organization with a focus such as DARPA’s should participate in SBIR/STTR 
topic generation, and what guidelines should be provided to smooth Phase III 
transitions for organizations that have a similar focus? 
Again, additional research would have to be conducted to determine the 
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3. Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research Plans—
Quadrennial Strategic Review 
Congress intended that, in order to align SBIR and STTR R&D with military 
priorities, DoD conduct a regular strategic review of SBIR and STTR topics:   
First and foremost, this Section addresses the need for a strategic, DoD-wide 
review of the SBIR and STTR programs (conducted no less than 
quadrennially) based on the latest research, science, and technology plans of 
the DoD.  The review should address the research priorities of the DoD 
(taking into account the warfighters’ needs), tie these priorities with the 
ongoing or anticipated acquisition programs, and also address the 
commercialization, manufacturing, and testing and evaluation of technologies 
funded through the SBIR and the STTR.  The strategic review process 
envisioned by this provision is also intended to guard the SBIR and STTR 
programs at the DoD against merely serving as a funding supplement to 
advance acquisition programs which suffer from a low level of technological 
maturity.  (Congressional Guidance Letter, 2006). 
To that end, our survey asked whether there was organizational participation 
in a Quadrennial Strategic Review of SBIR and STTR programs in accordance with 
the regulations, policies, or procedures that align topics with DoD research plans 
and program manager/program executive officer inputs to the same.   With a 
combined response rate of 75%, most respondents answered don’t know or never 
participated in such reviews (see Figure 5). 
Only 25% of the respondents indicated that in either most instances or in 
some instances, their organization participated in these reviews as required by 
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 Response to SBIR/STTR Quadrennial Strategic Review Figure 5.
 
 Response to SBIR/STTR Quadrennial Strategic Review by Responding Figure 6.
Organization 
Analysis. The organizational responses to the Quadrennial Strategic Review 





Does your organization participate in a quadrennial strategic review 
of SBIR and STTR programs in accordance with the regulations, 
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did not participate or didn’t know if their organization participated in the Secretary of 
Defense Quadrennial Strategic Review of SBIR and STTR topics. The Navy 
Department responses split between one respondent indicating that the Navy 
Department had participated in the Quadrennial Strategic Review in some instances, 
and the other respondent indicating that the Navy Department had never 
participated. One other Navy respondent did not provide any answer to the question. 
Also of interest was the response from the NGIA, which indicated that their 
organization participated in most instances. This response seemingly contradicts the 
responses from the previous questions in which NGIA answered either in the 
negative or not applicable to those parts of the legislation that required alignment 
with DoD research plans and program manager/program executive officer input to 
the Quadrennial Strategic Review.  
In any case, one can conclude from these results that the participation of the 
DoD organizations in the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Strategic Review of 
SBIR/STTR is low. Furthermore, during a literature review for the purposes of this 
report, no information was found regarding the SBIR/STTR Quadrennial Strategic 
Review. This may be due to the nature of the review itself or—more likely in the 
opinion of the authors—to the fact that the Review has not been conducted as the 
legislation stipulates. Since Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) was adopted, there have 
been two Quadrennial Defense Reviews, one in 2006 and the other in 2010, neither 
of which apparently had a Quadrennial Strategic Review conducted thereafter. 
C. Creation and Setup of the Commercialization Pilot 
Program (CPP) 
1. Creation of the Commercialization Pilot Program by Military 
Departments 
Paragraph (y)(1) of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) gives the Secretaries of 
Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force the authority to create a 
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transition of technologies, products, and services developed under the Small 
Business Innovation Research Program to Phase III, including the acquisition 
process.”  To that end, our survey asked whether military departments created a 
CPP. With a response of 62.5%, most respondents answered with an affirmative to 
the question as to whether their organization created the Commercialization Pilot 
Program (see Figure 7).  However, 25% of the respondents answered in the 
negative that their organization had not created the CPP, while 12.5% answered that 
creation of the CPP was not applicable to their organization. 
 




Has your organization created the Commercialization Pilot Program 
(CPP) to accelerate the transition to technologies, products, and 
services developed under the Small Business Innovation Research 
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 Response by Service to Creation of the Commercialization Pilot  Figure 8.
Program 
Analysis. The majority of the survey respondents from the military 
departments indicated that they had created the CPP; the Air Force responded 
slightly more in the affirmative than did the Navy respondents (Figure 8). 
The legislation’s language allowed the departments to create this program; 
they were not required to do so by the legislation. However, if they did choose to 
create the CPP, there were specific requirements that had to be followed because 
the CPP is self-funding. Whether the requirements were followed forms the basis for 
the next questions in this section. 
In the case of the Navy, whether the CPP was created as a separate program 
is a subject of some conjecture. A 2008 Navy SBIR Program Office report entitled A 
Report on the Navy SBIR Program: Best Practices, Roadblocks, and 
Recommendations for Technology Transition stated, “One could argue that the 
Navy’s SBIR program already meets the intent of the CPP legislation and we should 
continue business as usual” (p. iii). That study stated that the Navy’s Transition 
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knowledge and support gaps by providing support to these program participants 
within Phase II in order “to help the SBIR firm delivery [sic] a technology product to 
DoD and the Navy” (Navy SBIR Program Office, 2008, p. 35). 
In any case, the Navy does have what it calls “Phase II.5” initiative, which 
includes the TAP, and to which the Navy refers to as a CPP (Navy SBIR/STTR, n.d.-
a). The Navy SBIR and STTR Program Office utilizes self-funding set-asides for the 
CPP to pay for the TAP and has the SBIR transition manager at each System 
Command (SYSCOM) make the determination as to which firm gets invited to 
participate. In addition, each SYSCOM has its award structure and requirements to 
be selected for Phase II.5. 
This paper does not attempt to make any determination as to whether the 
Navy SBIR program—with the TAP and Phase II.5 component included—does or 
does not comply with the Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) definition of the CPP; it is clear 
from the evidence presented previously that the Navy SBIR and STTR Program 
Office believes that its SBIR program does meet the definition. Rather, the presence 
of the TAP may be confused with the CPP, which is why the Navy’s response seems 
to contradict itself. The potential confusion, however, is more than an issue of 
semantics because Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) has specific conditions on the usage 
of CPP funds which the Navy’s TAP and Phase II.5 would otherwise have to follow.  
In addition to the Air Force’s and Navy’s creation of the CPP, the Army, the 
Missile Defense Agency, and the Joint Science & Technology Office for Chemical 
and Biological Defense (JSTO–CBD) created CPPs. 
2. Identification of Projects for Rapid Transitioning Through the 
Commercialization Pilot Program 
Section 252 (y)(2) (NDAA, 2006) and the Congressional Guidance Letter 
(2006) called on military departments to establish processes or procedures for the 
identification of optimal SBIR Phase I or Phase II projects for rapid transitioning and 
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With a response of 62.5%, most respondents answered affirmatively to the question 
of whether their organization had some formal processes or procedures.  (see 
Figure 9). 
Conversely, 25% of the respondents answered in the negative, i.e., that their 
organization did not have the processes or procedures in place, and 12.5% 
answered that creation of the processes or procedures was not applicable to their 
organization. 
The breakdown of the responses to this question (see Figure 10) mirrored 
that of the previous question: namely, the Air Force led the Navy in answering 
affirmatively to this question; the one NGIA and one Air Force respondent answered 
negatively; and the one Navy respondent answered that the question was not 
applicable to his or her organization. 
 
 Responses to Formal Process for Identification of  Figure 9.




As part of the CPP, does your organization have formal processes or 
procedures for the identification of optimal SBIR Phase I and Phase II 
projects for rapid transitioning and related assistance through the CPP 
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 Response by Service to Identification of Projects for Rapid Transitioning Figure 10.
Through the Commercialization Pilot Program 
Analysis. On the whole, it can be concluded that most agencies that created 
the CPP came up with some sort of process for the identification of projects for rapid 
transitioning into the commercialization phase of the SBIR/STTR program. The 
negative responses to this question need to be viewed in the context of the previous 
question: namely, that the respondents either did not create the CPP in their 
organization, mixed up the CPP with other transition assistance programs, or were 
not clear about the legislative requirement. 
To further understand these results, we must look at the approach to 
identification of transition candidate projects by the various CPPs. The Air Force 
approaches SBIR project identification for its CPP using two approaches: technology 
needs identified by an Air Force acquisition organization and technology needs 
identified by a single major contractor. In both approaches, data mining of DoD 
Phase II databases occurred by Air Force experts at the various Air Force Product 
Centers and at the Air Force Research Lab. The experts look for promising 
candidates based on program executive office needs. The results of the search are 
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conduct interviews with the various small businesses during Industry Interchange 
Workshops. Then, the technical points of contact and the major contractors identify 
promising SBIR projects for inclusion into the CPP (Flake, 2007). 
The Navy approach involves the program executive office and the SYSCOM 
SBIR program manager and a technical monitor to decide which Phase II programs 
get included into their CPP. Each SYSCOM has its own identification processes 
relating to its areas of interest (Navy SBIR/STTR, n.d.-a). Since 2008, the Navy has 
also participated with the Air Force in Joint DoD Component Industry SBIR CPP 
Technology Interchange Workshops, although recent resource constraints make 
Navy attendance in the future questionable (U.S. Air Force, 2010). 
Survey responses to this question also relate to how each military department 
conducts initial topic selection for the SBIR program.  In  earlier studies conducted 
by the RAND Corporation and reported in a 2009 DoDIG report, the approaches to 
topic generation—and, as a result, projects—of the various military departments 
were discovered and analyzed. According to the 2009 DoDIG report, the Air Force 
and the Army “generated a majority of their topics in laboratories, whereas the Navy 
generated a majority of its topics through the acquisition program offices” (DoDIG, 
2009, p. 18). The DoDIG report (2009) also concurred with the 2007 National 
Research Council report entitled SBIR and the Phase III Challenge of 
Commercialization that the Navy approach to topic generation “expedited the 
transition to commercialization” (DoDIG, 2009, p. 17). Based on the current 
approach of the Army and Air Force, while there may have been improvements in 
the transition process of the respective CPPs, the Navy model appears to provide for 
greater acquisition program input with regard to generating topics that will be 
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3. Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP)—Certification of 
Technology Projects for Assistance by Department Secretary 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006), establishes a condition selecting SBIR R&D 
projects for CPP commercialization assistance.  Specifically, Section 252 prohibits 
selection of projects for such assistance “unless the Secretary of the military 
department concerned certifies in writing that the successful transition of the 
program to Phase III and into the acquisition process is expected to meet high 
priority military requirements of such military department.” (NDAA, 2006).  With a 
response of 50%, the plurality of respondents answered that they did not know 
whether their organization required Secretarial certifications as a precondition for 
receiving assistance under the CPP (see Figure 11). 
More than a third, 37.5%, of the respondents indicated that their organization 
never required the certification. Only 12.5% stated that their organization frequently 
requires the certification. 
 
 Response to Commercialization Pilot Program Certification of  Figure 11.
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 Response by Service to Commercialization Pilot Program  Figure 12.
Certification of Projects by Department Secretary 
 
 Response by Service to Commercialization Pilot Program  Figure 13.
Certification of Projects by Department Secretary (Adjusted for Removal of 
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Analysis. A casual look at the responses from the various military 
departments to the question about whether CPP assistance is conditioned on 
Secretaries certifications of high-priority military necessity indicates that a large 
portion of the respondents either do not know whether their organization is keeping 
this requirement or their organization never has kept it (see Figure 12). 
By removing from the answers those respondents who previously answered 
never or don’t know/not applicable to the question of whether their department or 
agency created the CPP, we are left with a clearer picture of actual use of 
Secretarial certifications (see Figure 13).  These adjusted results show that  the 
respondents from the Air Force, the department with the most frequent confirmation 
of creation of the CPP, the most frequent respondents confirming creation of the 
CPP, do not know whether the Air Force has implemented the requirement for 
certification in writing required in Section 252(y)(2).  Other responses show that 
Navy respondents are split on whether Secretarial certifications are utilized within 
the Navy Department, with one respondent answering frequently and the other 
answering never.  These responses indicate that further research needs to be done 
to determine the actual practices concerning Secretarial certifications. 
It appears that the Secretarial certification of high-priority military necessity 
may have been replaced in practice by opinions and choices of support contractors, 
including those support contractors which may have a financial interest in 
recommending particular SBIR projects.  As we previously outlined—and which we 
discuss in more detail later in this paper—the Air Force, Army, and certain Navy 
organizations utilize contractors such as MILCOM Venture Partners, MacAulay-
Brown, Willcor, and Dawnbreaker to assist in SBIR- and CPP-related projects at 
various phases. Some of these firms assist government personnel to determine 
whether specific small business firms are able to participate in providing proposals to 
announced topics at Phase I and whether the Phase I and Phase II firms will be 
allowed to participate in the CPP projects. In these instances, these contractors do a 
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department secretary’s certification as required in Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) was to 
make certain that projects seeking to progress though the CPP process into 
commercialization phases met the “high priority military requirements” of each 
department (NDAA, 2006, § 252 (y)(2)).  Whether contractors should be involved in 
making this determination is at the very least questionable since delegation of this 
function to contactors increases the potential for misalignment between military 
requirements and CPP assistance funds and makes the CPP less predictable for 
small business. As shown by the results to the question whether military 
departments condition selection for CPP on Secretarial certifications of high-priority 
military necessity, the Secretarial certification requirement is not being met.  Further 
research into the role of contractors in the determination of project approvals needs 
to be addressed. 
4. Commercialization Pilot Program (CPP)—Input by Program 
Managers or Program Executive Officers 
The Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) calls for input of program 
managers and program executive officers into various SBIR commercialization 
efforts, such as SBIR topic selection, SBIR program management, integration with 
DoD mission and acquisition framework, planning for Phase III funding through 
Program Objective Memoranda (POMs) and similar instruments, and utilizing 
enhanced testing and evaluation (T&E) authority.  To test implementation of this 
guidance, the survey asked the question as to whether military departments had 
formal processes or procedures for requiring program managers or program 
executive officers to provide input concerning SBIR topic generation and on 
accelerated integration of SBIR projects into the acquisition programs.  With a 
response of 75%, a majority of the respondents answered with an affirmative to this 
question (see Figure 14). 
The last quarter of the responses was evenly split between the respondents 
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procedures in place and who answered that creation of the processes or procedures 
was not applicable to their organization. 
 
 Response to Commercialization Pilot Program Input by  Figure 14.
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 Response by Service to Commercialization Pilot Program Input  Figure 15.
by Program Managers or Program Executive Officers 
Analysis. The responses by military departments to this question (see Figure 
15) indicate whether the respondent’s organization is in adherence to the 
requirements of the statute. However, the NGIA respondent who had previously 
indicated that his or her organization had not created the Commercialization Pilot 
Program still answered affirmatively that he or she had formal processes or 
procedures for program manager or program executive officer input as part of the 
CPP. 
Even when taking into account the seemingly erroneous response discussed 
previously, our conclusion is that the military departments and their component 
organizations usually, but not always, involve the program executive officers and 
program managers in topic generation within the context of the CPP. This is in 
contrast to the responses given to the question regarding program executive officer 
and program manager involvement in topic generation in general, reported in the 
section of this report titled Alignment of SBIR/STTR Topics With DoD Research 
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over 50% of the respondents answered that involvement of the program executive 
officer and program manager was not applicable. 
The involvement of program executive officers and program managers is 
critical in the topic generation and identification of projects into commercialization. In 
a 2009 study entitled An Assessment of the Small Business Innovation Research 
Program at the Department of Defense, the National Academy of Sciences identified 
that “active championing (of SBIR projects) by Program Executive Officers seems to 
be a critical ingredient in Phase III success” (p. 182).  The study also suggested 
having senior managers insist that all program managers “integrate SBIR fully into 
their acquisition programs” (p. 183).  These two recommendations represent a 
cultural change component that Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) tried to achieve by 
requiring program manager/program executive officer input in identifications of areas 
of effort and by reporting out of the activities of the program managers, program 
executive officers, and prime contractors in the form of the annual evaluative report 
on the CPP. 
Another issue that involves program managers and program executive 
officers is that of topic generation. According to the Government Accountability 
Office (GAO; 2010) report entitled Space Acquisitions: Challenges in 
Commercializing Technologies Developed under the Small Business Innovation 
Research Program, small businesses that were involved with SBIR projects in DoD 
space-related technologies related that there was limited “pull” from the acquisition 
programs (p. 23). According to the report, three reasons were given for this lack of 
pull: DoD topics in which there is no validated requirement, short tenure among DoD 
officials responsible for progress, and lack of SBIR knowledge among DoD officials 
(GAO, 2010, p. 23). Certainly, topic generation by the program managers and 
program executive officers should include validated requirements and be within the 
ability of the senior leadership to enforce. Lack of SBIR knowledge is being 
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to changes in organizational culture that apparently remains difficult to accomplish 
within the DoD. 
5. Commercialization Pilot Program—Support Contractors’ Influence 
on Selection of Projects for CPP Assistance 
As stated above, Section 252 (NDAA 2006) conditions the selection of SBIR 
projects for CPP assistance upon written certification by departmental Secretaries.  
In contrast, review of CPP-related publications, as described below, suggested that 
Secretarial decisions may have been delegated to private venture capital firms or 
advisory and assistance contractors in whole or in part.  Accordingly, this question 
asked whether any decisions to select SBIR Phase I or II projects for CPP 
assistance were made or in any way influenced by private contractors supporting the 
CPP program for the respondent agency or department.  
With a response rate of 83.3%, most respondents answered that their 
organization did not make decisions to select SBIR Phase I or Phase II projects for 
CPP assistance based on or influenced by contractors supporting the CPP for the 
organization (see Figure 16). 
However, 16.7% of respondents stated that their organizations’ decisions to 
select SBIR Phase I or Phase II projects was in some way influenced by one or 
more contractors supporting the CPP program for the organization. 
With the exception of one respondent from the Air Force, respondents from all 
other military departments, including all other Air Force respondents, indicated that 
contractor influence on decisions to select Phase I or II projects for CPP does not 
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 Response to Commercialization Pilot Program Contractor Influence Figure 16.
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Analysis. This finding is in contrast to the publically announced role of 
contractors in the various CPPs. With the passage of the SBIR Reauthorization Act 
of 2000 (Public Law 106-554), which amended Section 9 of the Small Business Act 
(15 U.S.C. 638), federal agencies were allowed to enter into an agreement with a 
vendor to provide “technical services.” The text of the section is as follows: 
(q) Discretionary technical assistance  
(1) In general  
Each Federal agency required by this section to conduct an SBIR program 
may enter into an agreement with a vendor selected under paragraph (2) to 
provide small business concerns engaged in SBIR projects with technical 
assistance services, such as access to a network of scientists and engineers 
engaged in a wide range of technologies, or access to technical and business 
literature available through on-line data bases, for the purpose of assisting 
such concerns in— 
(A) making better technical decisions concerning such projects;  
(B) solving technical problems which arise during the conduct of such 
projects;  
(C) minimizing technical risks associated with such projects; and  
(D) developing and commercializing new commercial products and processes 
resulting from such projects.  
(2) Vendor selection  
Each agency may select a vendor to assist small business concerns to meet 
the goals listed in paragraph (1) for a term not to exceed 3 years. Such 
selection shall be competitive and shall utilize merit-based criteria. (15 U.S.C. 
§ 638(q)). 
The safeguards question implicates significant public policies. For example, 
FAR Section 9.5 prohibits a contractor from having consultant conflicts of interest. 
FAR Section 9.505-1 specifically prohibits a contractor that has “provide(d) systems 
engineering and technical direction for a system but does not have overall 
contractual responsibility for its development, its integration, assembly, and 
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or to be a subcontractor or consultant to a supplier of the system or any major 
components. (2011). Further, FAR Subpart 7.5 (2011) prohibits the use of 
contractors for performance of inherently governmental functions.  Specifically, FAR 
Section 7.503 prohibits the use of contractors for the purposes of directing Federal 
employees, determining “Federal program priorities for budget requests,” and, “in 
Federal procurement activities with respect to prime contracts—  (i) determining 
what supplies or services are to be acquired by the government . . . ; (ii) participating 
as a voting member on any source selection boards; (iii) approving any contractual 
documents, to include documents defining requirements, incentive plans, and 
evaluation criteria; (iv) awarding contracts; (v) administering contracts (including 
ordering changes in contract performance or contract quantities, taking action based 
on evaluations of contractor performance, and accepting or rejecting contractor 
products or services).” (2011).    
Using the text of the law as a standard, we can examine the role of 
contractors in the CPP. For example, MILCOM Venture Partners is a firm that the 
Army selected to oversee its CPP implementation. The following information comes 
from MILCOM Venture Partners’ (n.d.) website and describes the company’s role in 
the Army CPP: 
MILCOM Venture Partners (MILCOM) was selected as the Army’s contractor 
to help manage the CPP, and will: 1) review current SBIR Phase II projects 
and recommend approximately 25 projects for participation in CPP; 2) provide 
assistance intended to accelerate technology transition and 
commercialization to the projects selected for CPP participation; and 3) 
recommend the amount of additional funding each participating SBIR Phase II 
project will be allocated from the $15 million CPP fund. In making 
recommendations for participation in CPP, the following characteristics will be 
given significant consideration by MILCOM: 
1. The Phase II technology meets a high priority Army requirement; 
2. The technology can be rapidly transitioned to Army acquisition and/or a 
commercial product; and,  
3. Transition to military or commercial products will provide a significant 
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Program, in the form of non-SBIR investment in such technology and 
product revenue. 
The Air Force has contracted with MacAulay-Brown Inc. to provide a lead 
role, variously described as that of SBIR/STTR program manager (Flake, 2009)  or, 
more recently, as SBIR/STTR project lead (Air Force SBIR/STTR, n.d. ).  The role of 
MacAulay-Brown was described in their press release at the time of the contract 
award: 
The Government-MacB Team will focus on improving the process of 
identifying and developing topics that address urgent warfighter needs and 
transition successful results to acquisition programs while strengthening 
awareness, involvement and advocacy of key S&T customers/stakeholders. 
(MacAulay-Brown, n.d.) 
The Navy also involves contractors to assist in their CPP. The contractor 
firms Dawnbreaker Inc. and Willcor have been contracted to provide program 
management support, technology transition, and risk management to firms that have 
SBIR/STTR projects. The firms’ involvement in CPP is outlined as follows: 
 Willcor is under contract to the Navy to assist companies with the use 
of Technology Risk Identification & Mitigation Software (TRIMS) for 
SBIR, a web based tool for risk assessment management, the 
performance of independent assessments, and assistance in 
developing risk mitigation strategies and plans. 
 Both Willcor and Dawnbreaker are under contract with the Navy to 
provide assistance to SBIR firms in planning their transition strategies. 
 Both Willcor and Dawnbreaker are under contract to assist firms with 
identifying issues, preparing manufacturing plans, and conducting 
Manufacturing and Production Readiness assessments. 
 Technology Readiness Assessments are used to assist firms in 
determining the development status of their technology (TRL) as well 
as conformance to requirements. Willcor is under contract to the Navy 
to provide these assessments. (Navy SBIR/STTR, n.d.-b) 
Dawnbreaker’s role within the Navy’s Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) 
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to provide Program and Technology Transition Management Support to the 
NAVAIR SBIR Program Office to implement a CPP which assists the NAVAIR 
Program Executive Officers (PEOs) and NAVAIR Acquisition Program 
Management Offices (PMAs) in identifying SBIR topics that meet the needs of 
the war-fighter, have the potential for rapid transition and to execute their 
transition from Phase II to Phase III and insertion into a Program of Record. 
(Dawnbreaker, n.d.-b) 
Dawnbreaker is also the major contractor in the Navy’s Transition Assistance 
Program (TAP). The TAP program assists Phase II SBIR/STTR awardees with “the 
services of a business acceleration manager, a market researcher, and others to 
accelerate the transition of their technology. This is accomplished through the 
application of a proven process and deliverables, developed collaboratively by the 
small business and the Navy TAP team” (Dawnbreaker, n.d.-a). 
Based on these materials, it is clear that there is significant contractor 
involvement in the CPPs at the various military departments, and it also appears that 
those contractors may have opportunities to receive financial benefits from individual 
CPP applicants either by being hired as their discretionary technical assistance 
providers or by becoming their venture capital investors. What is not clear, however, 
is whether any real safeguards exist within CPPs to prevent support contractors’ 
conflicts of interest or performance of inherently governmental functions.  With 
significant support contractor involvement in the CPP and lack of evidence of 
safeguards, there may be some unintentional violations or abuses—and possibly the 
role that contractors are actively playing exceeds that of the definition of 
discretionary technical assistance that was outlined in 15 U.S.C. § 638 (2010). The 
conclusion here is that this is an area in which more research should be conducted. 
D. Commercialization Pilot Program Incentives, Activities, 
and Initiatives 
1. Incentivizing Within the Commercialization Pilot Program 
The Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) instructs military departments to 
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SBIR/STTR technologies into the DoD acquisition process.  Then-Deputy Under 
Secretary of Defense James Finley issued SBIR Phase III Guidance (2008) directing 
the use of the SBIR special acquisition preference and data rights protections during 
Phase III.  With a response of 66.7%, most respondents answered that their 
organization did not develop, or deploy acquisition incentives to accelerate the 
transition of SBIR/STTR technologies into the acquisition process though the 
Commercialization Pilot Program (see Figure 18). 
A third, 33.3%, of respondents indicated that their organization did develop 
and deploy acquisition incentives to accelerate the transition of SBIR/STTR 
technologies into the acquisition process as part of the CPP. 
 




As part of the CPP, has your organization developed and deployed 
acquisition incentives and activities to accelerate the transition of SBIR 










do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 52 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
 Response by Service to Acquisition Incentivizing Within  Figure 19.
the Commercialization Pilot Program 
Analysis. The two Navy respondents who confirmed creation of the CPP 
were also the only respondents who indicated that the Navy used incentives within 
the Commercialization Pilot Program. The Air Force respondents indicated that the 
Air Force did not develop any acquisition incentives, even though this is well within 
the scope of the SBIR/STTR program and must be reported to Congress each year 
(see Figure 19). 
The subject of incentives was the central topic of interest at the SBIR and the 
Phase III Challenge of Commercialization Symposium held on June 14, 2005. The 
symposium was convened by the National Academy of Sciences (2005) and focused 
on the commercialization of SBIR-funded innovation projects at the DoD and NASA 
(p. xv). The term incentives was used at the Symposium in a very broad sense, 
covering a wide range of methods and techniques designed to motivate  government 
managers and executives as well as  large prime contractor firms to transition SBIR 
innovations into non-SBIR DoD procurements. The suggested ideas took the form of 
programmatic changes to funding, training, risk reduction (for all three entities: small 
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SBIR procurement projects and defense acquisition programs, and education 
outreach regarding the benefits of the SBIR program. The importance as well as 
broad nature of incentives was stressed repeatedly by the participants of this 
Symposium, earning 39 references to the term across 8 chapters in the Symposium 
Report. (NAS, 2007).  The centrality and scope of incentives were summarized at 
the Symposium as follows: 
In this era of globalization, optimizing the ability of small businesses to 
develop and commercialize new products is essential for U.S. 
competitiveness and national security. Developing better incentives to spur 
innovative ideas, technologies, and products—and ultimately to bring them to 
market—is thus a central policy challenge. (NAS, 2007, p. 3) 
To capitalize on SBIR’s potential, both better information (for small companies 
and large prime contractors) and supportive incentives are necessary. (NAS, 
2007, p. 28) 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) utilizes the term incentives specifically in 
paragraph (y)(5) with regard to the reporting of such in the annual evaluative report 
of the Secretary of Defense to the Senate committees on Armed Services and Small 
Business and Entrepreneurship and House committees on Armed Services and 
Small Business, but the Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) gives further 
instruction with regard to the intent of Congress to have the DoD consider issuing 
“binding directives, contract clauses, or regulatory amendments through the Defense 
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) to facilitate the requisite 
incentives.”  This guidance merely reflected effective law and practice.  Indeed, FAR 
Subpart 16.4 (2006), DFARS Subpart 216.4 (2006), and contemporaneous DoD 
practice at the time and since have treated incentives as primarily contractual and 
monetary, in the form of paying prime contractors either award fees based on 
positive qualitative performance evaluations in technical, scheduling, and other 
areas, or incentive fees for meeting or exceeding cost, performance, delivery 
targets. (GAO, 2005). 
In the 2006 SBIR CPP report to Congress, the intention of the DoD to utilize 
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The Department is exploring a range of incentives to stimulate the transition 
of SBIR funded technology for promulgation throughout the Department via 
appropriate mechanisms. Initiatives under consideration include: extension of 
SBIR Phase III permissive sole-source authority to SBIR subcontracts, 
reinforcement of SBIR Phase III sourcing authority and data rights, formal 
consideration of SBIR technology transition planning during acquisition review 
processes, favorable treatment of proposals which employ SBIR technologies 
or partnerships, use of incentive or award fees for SBIR-technology sourcing; 
wider employment of SBIR Phase III contracts toward meeting small business 
sourcing goals, to include possible multiple small business credits; and 
encouraging individual performance bonuses for personnel affecting SBIR 
technology transition. The new National Security Personnel System (NSPS) 
in the process of being rolled-out across the Department is well suited to 
implement this type of performance-based compensation. It will be up to each 
participating component and their subcomponents to take advantage of this 
opportunity to set output-based goals to measure this dimension of 
performance for relevant program officials while ensuring the integrity of 
source selection activities. (OUSD AT&L OSBP, 2007, p. 13) 
The lack of reported incentive usage would indicate a missed opportunity by 
the military departments. The different approaches to incentives as well as the level 
of utilization can be found in Table 2. 
2. Incentivizing Within the Commercialization Pilot Program—Types 
of Incentives Deployed 
Since the Navy respondents were the only ones who indicated the usage of 
incentives, all of the information in Table 2 is related to usage of the incentives within 
the Navy organizations, but the table also includes all of the types of incentives that 
could be utilized. 
As shown in Table 2, the most utilized incentives were as follows: 
 educational and business development assistance to SBIR firms 
focused on commercialization in federal and dual-use markets, and 
 outreach and advocacy with large prime contractors as well as defense 
acquisition and program management officials. 
Another type of incentive reported as having high utilization, though not a 
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 contract clauses or regulatory provisions expressly confirming SBIR 
data rights protections at Phase III at the prime contracting and 
subcontracting levels. Such clauses are set forth in FAR 52.227-20. 
In contrast, the least utilized incentive method was that of contract incentive 
clauses and bonuses to large prime contractors that integrate SBIR and/or STTR 
technologies. 
An area of additional research might therefore be the use of contract clauses 
or incentives to increase the transition of projects into Phase III as large prime 
contractors specially requested in the National Academies of Science SBIR 
Symposium (2005, p. 27). It is also worth studying whether funding currently spent in 
outreach and education may be more effective when redirected to these types of 
incentives. 
Table 2. Response to Acquisition Incentivizing Within Commercialization  
Pilot Program Types of Incentives Deployed 
Which type of incentives and activities did your organization develop and deploy as 
part of the CPP? (Select all that were utilized and indicate frequency of use) 
 












a. Educational and 
business development 
assistance to SBIR 
firms focused on 
commercialization in 
Federal and dual-use 
markets 
1 1 0 0 0 2 
Most 
utilized 
b. Outreach and 
advocacy with large 
prime contractors as 
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c. Contract incentive 
clauses and bonuses 
to large prime 
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contractors that 
integrate SBIR and/or 
STTR technologies 
d. Mentor-protégé 
arrangements for the 
benefit of SBIR and/or 
STTR firms 
0 0 1 1 0 2 
Some 
utilization
e. Dedication of 
specific acquisition 
dollars for integration 




0 0 1 1 0 2 
Some 
utilization
f. Contract clauses or 
regulatory provisions 
expressly confirming 
SBIR data rights 
protections at Phase 
III at the prime  
contracting and 
subcontracting levels 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The overall conclusion of this paper is that while the DoD began 
implementation of the DoD SBIR CPP and other Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) 
SBIR/STTR reforms, progress is uneven.  Specifically, military departments and 
DoD agencies participating in SBIR and STTR programs have not uniformly 
conformed to the mandatory Section 252 reforms.  When the Departments of 
Defense, Army, Navy, and Air Force implemented the optional Commercialization 
Pilot Program, they commonly used the CPP funds to hire business development 
and venture capital contractors as transition assistance advisers.  Although transition 
assistance advising is recognized by the Congressional Guidance Letter as a 
valuable form of assistance, the DoD and military departments seemed to disregard 
several other CPP elements that were expressly spelled in the statute.  For instance, 
the departments have largely not fulfilled the condition of secretarial certification of 
high military priority before technologies can qualify for CPP assistance and have 
declined to implement the CPP incentive authorities to the maximum extent 
practicable.  Unquestionably, the CPP informs the DoD acquisition community about 
valuable SBIR technologies and helps SBIR firms to engage in planning for SBIR 
technology insertion within the DoD.  However, as currently implemented, the CPP is 
not likely to significantly streamline the Phase III transition process, to change the 
culture of major acquisition program offices with regard to SBIR, to reduce 
technology insertion risk, or to incentivize leading prime contractors to utilize SBIR 
firms in major defense systems.  Legislative reforms are needed to rebalance and 
strengthen the CPP and other Section 252 reforms. 
A. Answers to Research Questions 
1. Alignment with DoD Research Plans 
With regards to the question of whether the military departments have aligned 
their SBIR/STTR topics with DoD research plans—which would include program 
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with research needs and have these topics certified by the respective military 
secretaries—we conclude that such alignment has not occurred at all. This is the 
case even though the Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) legislation and Under Secretary of 
Defense SBIR policy requires that this occur. We are left to determine an 
explanation for why this could have been the case.  Taking a positive perspective on 
this subject, we suggest that either there is a level of ignorance of the Section 252 
statute and policy reflected in the Congressional Guidance Letter, which can be 
remedied by education and management actions, or that the respondents just did 
not know the answer to the survey questions. On the other hand, this may also 
suggest that there is resistance in the DoD organization to taking a new approach to 
topic creation. This, in turn, indicates a challenge to an organization’s culture, which 
will be more difficult to change, but not impossible, when combined again with 
education and a strong influence from upper levels of management. In any case, the 
responses to this question would indicate that opportunities for further research exist 
in trying to determine why the respondents answered in the way they did and to 
effect change leading to alignment. 
2. The Commercialization Pilot Program 
The conclusion we reach as to whether the Commercialization Pilot Program 
was created and conducted within the requirements of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) is 
a qualified yes. The military departments reported, and documentary evidence exists 
for the Army (which did not participate in the survey), that there has been a CPP 
created in each of the military departments and that there is a large degree of input 
by program managers/program executive officers in the selection of SBIR/STTR 
projects to be included in the CPP. The overall implementation of the 
Commercialization Pilot Program was positive but suffered from the seeming 
ignorance of the secretarial certification reporting requirements of the legislation, the 
potential inappropriate use of contractors resulting in their performance of roles that 
are governmental functions, and the low utilization of incentives. These findings 
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agencies that did implement the CPP seemed to pick and choose which 
requirements within the legislation they would implement.  
As mentioned previously, our research has shown that there had been 
contractors performing some of the functions that were delegated to the department 
secretary, including the certification process to determine which projects are to be 
given assistance. Contractor participation in the certification process and the 
approach to use contractors as “gatekeepers” within SBIR Phase I and II projects 
shows that contractor influence in those military departments’ SBIR/STTR CPPs is 
organic—perhaps not by design but nevertheless is present throughout. This 
pervasive contractor influence may create issues in the CPP decision-making 
process, leading to misalignment of CPP resources. We suggest that additional 
research be performed to look at this issue and to make certain governmental 
functions are being performed by the proper government authorities, as well as to 
erect barriers to potential organizational conflicts of interest.  
Our research has also shown the lack of contractual or other, non-advocacy 
incentives being utilized within the DoD SBIR/STTR CPP. As was noted in the DoD 
Report for FY2006 to Congress on the Commercialization Pilot Program, the DoD 
would undertake an exploration of the use of incentives to encourage the transition 
of SBIR technologies throughout the DoD. (OUSD AT&L OSBP, 2007). Four years 
later, our research has determined that incentive usage is almost non-existent and 
that it should be emphasized or re-emphasized to the Services. This is an area in 
which more research should be conducted to ascertain the apparent resistance of 
the military departments and defense agencies to incentivizing SBIR participants. 
3. Promotion of Manufacturing Innovation through SBIR and STTR 
Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) directed all SBIR-participating Federal agencies, 
including DoD, to fully implement the tenets of Executive Order No. 13329, 
Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing (2004), thereby making that Order part of 
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departments, defense agencies, and the DoD planned to implement or actually 
implemented Executive Order No. 13329, Encouraging Innovation in Manufacturing 
(2004). By means of a literature review, we found that some military departments 
and defense agencies have posted plans or made references to plans to encourage 
manufacturing in their respective SBIR/STTR programs at publicly available 
websites. During 2011, the Executive Order No. 13329 webpage on the DoD 
SBIR/STTR site listed links to the Army’s, Navy’s, Air Force’s, and DARPA’s 
Executive Order No. 13329 (2004) Manufacturing Innovation Plans, but the links are 
no longer live and these organization’s website do not have such Plans readily 
available, either.  (DoD SBIR Program Office 2011). 
This report does not make any conclusions regarding these efforts and 
suggests that further research be conducted to ascertain compliance with Section 
252 (NDAA, 2006) and Congressional intent in that regard. 
4. A Final Post-Survey Observation 
As we compiled our findings for this section, it seemed that a possible reason 
for the disconnect between some of the specific items mentioned in the legislation 
(such as the creation of the CPP and the intent of Congress as outlined in the 
Congressional Guidance Letter (2006) stipulating certain types of incentives and the 
process for actual implementation of Section 252) may have been that the 
Congressional Guidance Letter was not widely disseminated among the Secretaries 
of military departments and DoD officials involved with SBIR and STTR.   The 
following chronology supports this conclusion.  On May, 16, 2006, the leaders of 
Congressional Small Business Committees wrote this Letter to the Honorable 
Kenneth J. Krieg, then the USD(AT&L), requesting a meeting by June 16 to discuss 
how the DoD was planning to implement Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) and requesting 
that a written status be presented at that meeting. We know of no evidence that this 
meeting occurred or that the written status was provided. Mr. Krieg announced his 
resignation on June 6, 2007, effective July 20 of the same year. What level of 
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assessment may be required upon wide circulation of the Congressional Guidance 
Letter (2006) to determine whether this conclusion is correct.  Further, to ensure full 
awareness of Congressional intent in regard to the desired outcomes and means to 
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VII. Comparative Defense Small Business R&D 
Policy: Lessons from the United Kingdom 
Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) 
A. Introduction 
Major American defense allies and defense industrial partners (but, 
sometimes, industrial competitors) have been conducting their own experiments with 
SBIR-type programs.  These experiments have also taken up the challenge of 
enhancing commercialization of small business technologies through government 
procurement.   In examining international lessons for the DoD SBIR program, the 
experience of the United Kingdom (UK) holds particular importance.  The UK 
operates the Small Business Research Initiative (“SBRI”) modeled and branded on 
the example of the U.S. SBIR (Kidalov, 2011).  There are several reasons that the 
UK experience is of key importance to U.S. policy-makers working on DoD 
SBIR/STTR CPP/CRP reforms. 
First, the UK has a sophisticated public and defense procurement sector.  At 
approximately $63 billion a year, the UK has the fourth largest military budget in the 
world and the second largest in NATO (Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute, 2011).  The UK defense procurement budget grew from between £9–£10 
billion as of 2003 (Taylor, 2003) to £13 billion as of 2009 (Defence Equipment & 
Support [DE&S], n.d., p. 3).  The UK defense R&D expenditures amounted to 
approximately £2.6 billion as of 2006 (Ministry of Defence, 2007) but decreased to 
approximately £0.54 billion in 2007–2008 and budgeted for further decrease to 
£0.439 billion in 2010–2011 (Chuter, 2010).   The UK Defence Equipment & Support 
agency employs a large acquisition workforce of approximately 25,5000 people 
(DE&S, n.d.).    
Second, the UK program has a close similarity to the U.S. programs.  From 
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least 2.5% of their R&D requirements, though in 2009 it became a discretionary 
initiative which government departments would take up on a case-by-case basis. 
(Bound & Puttick, 2010, p. 7-8).  Overall, the UK SBRI program is administered by 
the Technology Strategy Board (TSB), a stand-alone government agency funded by 
the Department of Business, Innovation, and Skills (DBIS).  Within the UK Ministry of 
Defence (MOD), SBRI is administered by the Center for Defence Enterprise (CDE) 
with TSB assistance.  Like SBIR, SBRI is a three-phase program that has a Phase I 
for feasibility study, Phase II for prototype development, and Phase III, a somewhat 
informal phase involving procurement of a finished product, technology, or service 
through the open commercial market, open competitive procurements, the MOD 
Urgent Operational Requirements (UOR) sole-source contracts, or preferences 
under the so-called “innovative procurement plans” established by buying agencies 
(Kidalov, 2011, p. 505; Pro Inno Europe, 2010; Office of Government Commerce 
[OGC], n.d.). All SBRI awards are contracts rather than grants. Phase II participants 
are chosen through an assessment process at the end of Phase I (TSB, n.d.-b).  
Just like the U.S. SBIR program, the UK SBRI program has been the subject of 
several recent reforms and high-level government and academic assessments as 
further described below. 
Third, SBRI is a strong tool for support of the UK defense industrial base.  
The importance of hi-tech defense-related small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs) is mentioned in two key UK documents: the 2005 Defence Industrial 
Strategy and its replacement, the 2012 National Security Through Technology: 
Technology, Equipment, and Support for UK Defence and Security (Luff & 
Brokenshire, 2012).  Furthermore, the UK treats SBRI as a form of “pre-commercial 
procurement” regulated under the European Union (EU) state aid framework instead 
of the EU procurement directives (OGC, n.d.; TSB, n.d.-b; UK House of Lords, 
2010).  As a result, UK authorities are able to impose stronger small business and 
domestic business preferences into the SBRI criteria without fear of challenge by 
other EU member states under the EU procurement directives or of challenges by 
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Procurement (GPA) due to lack of exemption from the GPA for EU small business 
set-asides (GPA; Kidalov, 2011).    
B. UK SBRI Program Origins: Good Intentions, False Start 
The UK SBRI program was originally instituted in 2001with the aim of 
boosting innovative government procurement from SMEs. It established a target of 
2.5% of external government R&D to be spent with SMEs and created a website 
allowing R&D spending departments to advertise contracts.  As of March 2005, the 
UK government  made the 2.5%  voluntary target mandatory in order to encourage 
departmental spending with SMEs.  SBRI was intended to replicate the successes of 
the U.S. SBIR program (Bound & Puttick, 2010; see also Connell, n.d.).   The 
original SBRI was a single-phase program, with individual contract awards up to 
£100,000.  
However, as noted by the UK National Endowment for Science, Technology, 
and the Arts (NESTA) (Bound & Puttick, 2010) and research from the University of 
Cambridge (Connell, 2009), the original SBRI was an ineffective government policy.  
SBRI’s effectiveness lagged because procuring agencies widely sabotaged the 
government’s intent and mainly awarded SMEs consultancy contracts to write policy 
reports, with less than 1% of awards going to true R&D.    
As a result, in 2004, a four-year-long campaign was launched to reform the 
UK SBRI program, including the 2005 “private member’s” legislation to establish an 
innovation procurement program and the 2005 2.5% set-aside mandate (Connell, 
2009; Bound & Puttick, 2010).   
C. The 2005 UK Defence Industrial Strategy 
In December 2005, the UK Secretary of State for Defence adopted the UK 
Defence Industrial Strategy, which addressed, among other things, the role of MOD 
in buying innovative technologies from SMEs and, specifically, the SBRI program.  
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the U.S. Congress passed the Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) SBIR Commercialization 
Pilot Program and related reforms aligning DoD SBIR with DoD research and 
technology priorities.    
This Strategy emphasized greater insertion of innovative technologies 
developed by SMEs by means of “pull-through” strategies.  (MOD, 2005). The 
Strategy noted “a shift away from platform orientated programmes towards a 
capability-based approach, with corresponding implications for the demand required 
of the traditional defence industrial base.”  (MOD, 2005, p. 15). This shift includes 
“substantial transformation” toward maintenance, support, and upgrade of major 
platforms with long service life, such as aircraft carries, Type 45 Destroyers, 
armored fighting vehicles, and the A400M, Typhoon, and Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft.  
These changing strategic imperatives created the climate involving both threats and 
opportunities to small UK defense firms:   
This means the future business for the defence industry in many sectors will 
be in supporting and upgrading these platforms, rapidly inserting new 
technology to meet emerging threats, fulfill new requirements and respond to 
innovative opportunities, not immediately moving to design the next 
generation. In parallel, the extent of industrial rationalisation means that 
sustaining competition to meet domestic requirements is increasingly difficult. 
In several sectors, following the entry into service of major projects, there will 
be substantial overcapacity in production facilities in the UK defence industry 
in a few years’ time. . . . And as we look to non-UK sources of supply, 
whether at the prime or sub-systems level, we need to continue to recognise 
the extent to which this constrains the choices we can make about how we 
use our Armed Forces – in other words, how we maintain our sovereignty and 
national security. (MOD, 2005, p. 6). 
The UK Defence Industrial Strategy defined this approach as “throughlife 
capability management,” confirming “a general shift in defence acquisition away from 
the traditional pattern of designing and manufacturing successive generations of 
platforms,” which aimed to add leaps in capability “towards a new paradigm centered 
on support, sustainability and the incremental enhancement of existing capabilities 
from technology insertions.” (MOD, 2005, p. 17).  In technical terms, throughlife 
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as well as system engineering competencies to support greater technology insertion.  
In business and legal terms, throughlife capability management will emphasize 
greater opportunities for industry through “longer, more assured revenue streams 
based on long-term support and ongoing development rather than a series of big 
‘must win’ procurements.”  (MOD, 2005, p. 17). 
The Defence Industrial Strategy noted that the UK Defence Logistics 
Organization (now part of the UK Defence Equipment and Support [DE&S]) “and its 
key suppliers are already establishing innovative arrangements around key 
programmes to move industry’s support role away solely from supply of spares and 
maintenance services towards supply of asset availability and incremental upgrade 
of capability. . . . This requires the development of acquisition models that engage a 
range of industrial players including equipment design authorities (e.g. aircraft 
Original Equipment Manufacturers), technology inserters (such as defence 
electronics companies), integrators of complex systems and/or military capability 
integrators and innovators (e.g. niche technology companies).”  (MOD, 2005, p. 27).  
The UK Defence Industrial Strategy addressed SBRI in two discussions on 
the role of the UK Government: government as an investor and government as a 
planner.  In terms of the government’s role as an investor, the Defence Industrial 
Strategy noted that investment in military technological capabilities “fits within a 
broader framework of Government support to science, technology and innovation. 
The Government’s target is to raise the overall level of research and development 
(R&D) investment in the UK from its current level of 1.9% of GDP to 2.5% by 2014, 
and our approach to this is described in the Government’s ten year Science and 
Innovation Investment Framework published in July 2004, and the work coordinated 
by the business-led Technology Strategy Board (TSB) which aims to support the 
pull-through of ideas emerging from the UK’s world class science and engineering 
base” (emphasis added; MOD, 2005, p. 34).  As previously noted, research priorities 
in TSB topics are aligned with national technology priorities identified by the 
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Strategy, TSB aims to ensure that “the UK to be seen as a global leader in 
innovation and a magnet for technology-intensive companies. This also takes into 
account existing national strategies, for example, the aerospace research priorities 
identified by the National Aerospace Technology Strategy taking forward the work of 
the Aerospace Innovation and Growth Team” (MOD, 2005, pp. 34-35). 
Where the UK Ministry of Defence would act as a planner, the Defence 
Industrial Strategy emphasized availability of information and clear lines of authority 
to communicate the government’s acquisition requirements:  
[W]e intend to make as much information available to industry as possible, 
ranging from publishing information on equipment projects annually, to 
deeper joint planning activity where this is suitable and can realise substantial 
benefits on both sides without excluding other companies inappropriately. We 
are also, with this strategy, publishing a guide to make clearer for industry 
who does what within the MOD and who therefore is empowered and able to 
speak authoritatively to industry on particular topics. In sum, we plan to move 
substantially to a more open and consistent face towards industry. (MOD, 
2005, p. 134)  
Specifically, the Defence Industrial Strategy promised: 
We will take action to create a strong programme management environment 
around our projects that will: manage the overarching portfolio of projects 
within a capability area, including research and technology, capability 
upgrade and in-service capability in a coherent manner. Programme teams 
will be accountable for the initiation and execution of projects, working with 
suppliers to reduce the likelihood of individual projects over-running and the 
impact on the wider acquisition budget if this is unavoidable; manage cross 
project issues; oversee the integration of projects and other Lines of 
Development into military capability; increase our capability to trade-off 
between performance, time and cost; and provide a focal point for 
underpinning industrial base issues and ensure coherent engagement with 
the market. This will include an intelligent approach to the structuring of the 
supply chain to maximise innovation and nurture the necessary systems 
engineering capabilities; act as overarching design authority for the capability 
area; to enable faster and cheaper capability upgrade; manage the insertion 
of new technologies and increments; better focus on the pull-through of new 
technology; exploit opportunities to reduce through-life costs by more 
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in developing programme management capabilities and competence within 
acquisition. (MOD, 2005, p. 135)  
Thus, the 2005 Defence Industrial Strategy not only announced the pull-
through approach to buying innovative technologies that address defense needs, but 
it also included SBRI as an integral part of this approach.  
D. The 2007 Lord Sainsbury Review and Follow-Up 2008 
Reforms 
In October 2007, SBRI was assessed as part of the so-called “Lord Sainsbury 
Review” of the UK science and innovation policies (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 2007).  
Lord David Sainsbury, the former UK Science Minister, found that  
The UK SBRI has so far failed to achieve anything like the success of the US 
scheme, even allowing for the different legal frameworks and smaller budgets 
it operates under. Almost every department claims to spend more than its 2.5 
per cent allocation, and have done so since before the mandatory target was 
introduced. But the introduction of this target appears to have made no 
difference to departmental behaviour. SMEs are asked to tender for specific 
pieces of research, many of them concerned with the development of policy, 
rather than being asked to bring forward research projects in scientific or 
technical areas where the government department wants to see research 
take place. There is no active engagement with suppliers beyond the 
completion of a contract. As a result, the scheme has done little more than 
reproduce existing practice – with an additional bureaucratic burden. (Lord 
Sainsbury of Turville, 2007) 
In March 2008, the agency predecessor of the UK Department for Business, 
Innovation, and Skills published a progress report, entitled Implementing the Race to 
the Top: Lord Sainsbury’s Review of the Government’s Science and Innovation 
Policies” (Department for Innovation, Universities & Skills, 2008).  Both the 
Sainsbury review and the progress report called for reforms to the UK SBRI program 
building upon the foundation of the “principles of the US SBRI scheme” and with 
further enhancements, such as: 
 requiring buying agencies’ focus “on active engagement with 
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departmental objectives” (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 2007, p.126; 
Department of Innovation, Universities, and Skills, 2008, p. 38);  
 simplified, up-front designation of technology areas for future projects;  
 a two-phase award structure in order to reduce innovation risks;  
 allowing SMEs to retain intellectual property;  
 excluding humanities and social sciences research and consultancy 
projects from SBRI;   
 requiring that “SBRI awards must take the form of contracts, not equity 
loans or grants—this will ensure that departmental objectives are 
clearly identified and met, and will enable the award of an SBRI 
contract to act as a ‘seal of approval’, reassuring future investors and 
customers of the firm’s value” (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 2007, p.131; 
Department of Innovation, Universities, and Skills, 2008, p. 38).    
 giving “a central administrative role be given to the Technology 
Strategy Board. Government Departments should be required twice 
yearly to notify the Technology Strategy Board in a standard form of 
those technological areas where they would like to support projects. 
The Technology Strategy Board would then be responsible for 
publishing twice a year, at fixed dates, a list of those projects notified to 
it by Government Departments so that SMEs are readily able to find 
them. ” (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 2007, p.131);    
 recommending that “[t]he awarding contracts should also be 
administered by the Technology Strategy Board, with assessments of 
proposals being made jointly with the relevant Government 
Departments” (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 2007, p.131;);   
 finding that “SBRI targets for extramural departmental R&D should 
build up over three years, from 1.5% in the first year to 2% in the 
second year and 2.5% in the third year” ” (Lord Sainsbury of Turville, 
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In April 2009, after a pilot project in late 2008, the SBRI program was 
reintroduced largely along the lines recommended in the Lord Sainsbury review 
(Bound & Puttick, 2010, p. 3).   
E. SBRI Government-Wide Framework: The Role of the 
Technology Strategy Board (TSB) 
In its current version, the UK SBRI program is administered by the TSB, a 
quasi-independent executive agency under the DBIS.  The TSB provides agencies 
with the following key incentives:  
1. co-funding of SME awards;  
2. market research into industry capabilities, which can be taken into 
account by the buying agencies in designing topics;  
3. publicity, promotion, and advertising of topics for competitions;  
4. assistance with evaluation of proposals, if requested; and  
5. assistance with administration of SBRI awards, if requested. (TSB, 
n.d.-b )   
TSB staff includes experts in technical areas.  These experts are outside of 
buying agencies.  Technologists from the TSB and agencies focus on problem 
definitions and unpacking.  The TSB also administers a number of R&D programs.  
These programs include Collaborative R&D, resembling a cross between two U.S. 
programs, STTR and Technology Innovation Program (TIP) (Schacht, 2010), as well 
as SBRI, resembling the U.S. SBIR program.  The Collaborative R&D program 
requires collaboration between businesses and universities. (Frankel, 2012).     
The SBRI program focuses on “pre-commercial procurement,” where small 
business set-asides are allowed under the new EU Directives. (UK House of Lords, 
2010, p. 9).  “SBIR type schemes fall into the category of pre-commercial 
procurement. They differ from ‘standard’ procurement in that the purchase is of R&D 
rather than goods and services. This has advantages, for example the fact of being 
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it is much easier to target benefits on a national or regional basis, but is a much 
smaller scale activity. Ultimately the real challenge is to unlock the potential in the 
16% or so of GDP that is involved in the procurement of goods and services.” (UK 
House of Lords, 2010, p. 18).  As of May 2011, however, the TSB issued guidance 
claiming that SBRI was not state aid (TSB, n.d.-c).  SBRI constitutes 100% funded 
R&D.  SBRI contract awards are deliverable-based, and neither time and materials 
nor cost-plus contracts are allowed.  Intellectual property (IP) rights remain with the 
SMEs, while the government takes up license to use. 
1. SBRI Program Size 
Immediately prior to reforms, SBRI was assigned at least £47.7 million in 
contracts for 2007–2008.  This amounted to 11% of the UK’s civilian R&D budget 
(without counting defense R&D awards; Pro Inno Europe, 2009).  Following the 
reforms, according to a June 2010 NESTA report, total SBRI spending amounted to 
£27 million actual awards in 2009 (including 2008 pilots) as well as projected awards 
of £46.9 million to £50 million in 2010, and £96.9 million to £100 million in 2011 
(Bound & Puttick, 2010).  As of the time of the June 2010 NESTA assessment, 
SBRI, during the 2008–2009 period, involved 28 competitions by 13 government 
agencies with 425 contract awards; of those, £4.8 million were spent through a one-
time special TSB program and 370 contracts worth £24.5 million were awarded 
between April 2009 and December 2009 (Bound & Puttick, 2010).  SBRI are funded 
with a mix of procurement agency funds and TSB complimentary funds.  The TSB’s 
“core competitions” SBRI funding was recently budgeted at £10 million for 2010 and 
2011 and later reduced to £3.8 million (Bound & Puttick, 2010, n. 34).  The TSB also 
assists agencies with promoting, coordinating, and evaluating these competitions 
(Bound & Puttick, 2010).   
2. SBRI Technology Gap Solution Function 
SBRI awards are made on the basis of open competition on any topic an 
agency wants.  Agencies use SBRI to solve internal technology gaps.  SBRI 
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statements of work which should result in a “well-defined prototype” by the 
conclusion of Phase II. (UK OGC, 2009).  SBRI functions as a market intelligence 
tool for its technology gaps: agencies use SBRI to find out the state-of-the-art of 
industry.  As part of this market research process, SBRI reaches into cross-industry, 
cross-sector applications.  Contractors are not required to provide a record of three 
years of past performance as they may be required to provide as part of tendering 
process in mainstream UK MOD procurements.   
For SBRI topic definition as well as promotion and outreach, the TSB relies 
on itself, the buying agencies, and industry supporters such as the Confederation of 
British Industry.  The TSB also relied on the TSB’s own civilian- and defense-
focused knowledge transfer networks (KTNs; TSB, n.d.-a).  KTNs are funded 
networks focused on specific sectors and play a significant role in the creation of 
technology road maps of the government, dual-use, and commercial markets for 
emerging SME innovations.  For instance, the UK Aerospace and Defence KTN is 
the “custodian” of the National Aerospace Technology Strategy (NATS).  NATS “was 
formulated through government, business and academia working collaboratively to 
layout the technology requirements so that the sector could by 2020 realise its vision 
that: ‘The UK will offer a global aerospace industry, the world’s most innovative and 
productive location, leading to sustainable growth for all its stakeholders.’”  (TSB, 
n.d.-d). As NATS custodian, the KTN 
works with the Aerospace Technology Steering Group (ATSG) made up of 
government, industry, regional and academic representatives to refresh the 
strategy and publish regularly updated technology roadmaps. Providing 
advice at a more detailed level are 10 National Technical Committees (NTCs) 
focusing on specific areas of research and technology, e.g. materials & 
structures, electrical power systems. . . . This process enables the UK 
aerospace sector to clearly articulate to all its stakeholders, government, 
regions, SMEs etc, the areas of technology and investment focus needed to 
ensure the UK retains its ranking as the world’s second largest aerospace 
economy in an increasingly globalised and competitive market. NATS 
provides the framework to translate science through to innovative 
technologies and processes, from the research base through to market.  
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of £464 million across more than 70 projects and programmes. This includes 
over £230 million of government support sourced through the Technology 
Strategy Board’s open competition, collaborative R&D vehicle and 
complementary support from Regional Development Agencies and Devolved 
Administrations. (TSB, n.d.-d) 
3. The SBRI Phase I and II Process 
SBRI usually takes place in two phases, although the two-phase process is 
not required.  A typical SBRI competition requires agencies to establish an advanced 
procurement plan with two years of lead-time.  Because government agencies take 
up SBRI competitions on a discretionary basis, an agency must “identify a serious 
operational or policy problem and work out the clearest way to communicate their 
need or problem to businesses” (Bound & Puttick, 2010).  Operational problems are 
situations where agencies expect to be the ultimate customers of SBRI-developed 
solutions, while policy problems are situations where agencies simply expect to be 
demonstration customers, but the ultimate goal of the project is to fund a new 
technology that could be adopted in the private marketplace in furtherance of a 
desired social, environmental, or other policy objective (Bound & Puttick, 2010).  
Under general TSB guidance, Phase I concerns proof of feasibility, is valued 
between £20,000 to £100,000, and lasts two to nine months.  Phase II concerns 
proof of development, is valued up to £1 million, and lasts up to two years.  Phases I 
and II can be combined (Bound & Puttick, 2010).  The SBRI proposals are typically 
evaluated by technical proposal assessors and financial assessors.  First, five 
individual assessors evaluate proposals, then the proposals go to the assessment 
panels, and then rankings are awarded (only for prototype development).   
Assessment panels are focused on disruptive technologies search.  SBRI features 
electronic proposal assessment, and the TSB has online processes and templates.   
4. Phase III Ambiguity 
Unlike the United States, the UK does not automatically confer a special 
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However, the UK Office of Government Contracting (OGC) SBRI Top Level 
Process guidance provides the following explanation on the Open Procurement 
stage after Phase II: 
The Department or Public Sector Body Procures a Solution to the Challenge.  
A required innovative process, material, device, product or service should 
have been produced for the focused technology research area. This may 
require further work outside the SBRI funded period.  It is hoped that the 
Department or public sector body will procure the result of their SBRI 
investment as a solution to the problem or issue . . .  The company is free to 
market their innovative product to other alternative market. . . .To ensure an 
innovative solution is created the problem or issue needs to be defined in 
terms of the desired outcome.  The challenge is the procurement requirement 
for a more innovative solution obtained through accelerated technology 
development. (UK OGC, 2009).  
Another version of TSB guidance states that at the end of Phase II, “it is 
intended that what has been achieved will be manufactured and purchased by the 
Department [which established the need for the topic] as a way of fulfilling their 
procurement requirements” (Kidalov, 2011, p. 506). 
F. Ministry of Defence SBRI: The Role of the Center for 
Defence Enterprise 
The CDE’s requirement for DE&S ownership of SBRI topics and project 
monitoring is consistent with the overall pull-through approach of the UK Defence 
Industrial Strategy to acquisition and R&D program management.   
The CDE describes itself as a one-stop-shop interface: “the first point of 
contact for anyone with a disruptive technology, new process or innovation that has 
a potential defence application. CDE is a gateway between the outside world and 
the Ministry of Defence (MOD), bringing together innovation and investment for the 
defence market, ensuring that our front-line forces have the best battle-winning 
technologies for the future.”  (CDE, n.d.-a). Figure 20 below illustrated the structure 
of such one-stop-shop framework.  The CDE is part of the Defence Science and 
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Defence.  On the other hand, UK defense procurement is run by the Defence 
Equipment and Supply (DE&S) organization (commonly referred to by the name of 
its headquarters, Abbey Wood), although the DSTL can provide scientific and 
technical support to DE&S efforts.  (Defense Science and Technology, n.d. –e). The 
CDE variably describes itself as “a first point of contact” that can advise the industry 
on pre-proposal matters, as well as “a gateway to obtain proof-of-concept funding to 
help you to develop your idea.” (CDE, n.d.-b). 
According to the CDE’s director, Dr. Helen Almey (2010), the CDE was the 
initiative of Lord Paul Rudd Drayson.  Lord Drayson is a former engineering 
entrepreneur and Oxford entrepreneurship scholar who served in several senior UK 
government positions comparable to the U.S. positions of the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]) as well as the Chief 
Counsel for Advocacy of the U.S. Small Business Administration. The CDE was 
stood up in about four months, between December 2007 and March 2008, and in 
April/May 2008, it launched an evaluation of proposals.  According to Dr. Almey, the 
structure of the CDE and its process is derived from a survey/audit of MOD R&D and 
procurement practices conducted by CDE staff member Gavin Copeland.  The 
survey/audit sought to answer the question of why SMEs and academics do not 
work with the MOD as much as the MOD would like.  It must be noted that similar 
questions continue to be raised by the UK MOD’s 2010 Green Paper, entitled 
Equipment, Support, and Technology for UK Defence and Security—A Consultation 
Paper (Defence Science and Technology, 2011).    
The CDE is present among the science and technology companies by virtue 
of being based at a so-called “innovation triangle,” the Harwell Science and 
Innovation Campus in Oxfordshire.  It has a skeleton staff of less than 10 and is 
largely virtual in its operations.  The CDE is not a call center, and it is open to visitors 
from industry and academia who would like to schedule an appointment.  The CDE 
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The CDE’s goal is to evaluate and fund all proposals through a 15-day 
transparent cycle: 10 days of assessing, and five days of contact with the offeror.  
The CDE operates on a one-stop-shop principle in that it is able to pull together 
funding from different sources and programs.  Any technology funded through the 
CDE must have the MOD acquisition market either through prime contracts or 
subcontracts with major defense firms as its commercialization target.   Proposal 
calls balance the needs for previously identified and requested priority technologies, 
procured through “themed calls,” and brand new, out-of-the box technologies that 
have not been previously identified or requested by Abbey Wood are procured 
through a “standby open innovation call.”  This standby call for open innovations 
funds proposals on any idea relevant to the MOD out of a £3 million ($5 million) 
fund.  Upon positive assessment, the CDE provides additional funding on most 
applications.  The CDE typically receives 20–40 proposals a month under an open 
call.  Themed calls are conducted with the intent of awarding funds received from 
Abbey Wood organizations, approximately £300,000 (or about $500,000) per call.  
Phase I SBRI results must be delivered within 100 days, forcing speedy pace by the 
industry.   
As of August 2010, the CDE conducted over 50 seminars and conferences.  
The TSB assisted the CDE with publicity and promotion.  Often, the seminars are 
linked to calls, and major prime contractors offer to pay for the venues from time to 
time.  SMEs may receive face-to-face opportunities in 30-minute slots. 
To succeed for CDE funding, all SBRI proposals must be evaluated according 
to the following factors:  
1. Operational potential for the idea;  
2. Potential for exploitation;  
3. Support of UK supplier base (a critical factor); 
4. Scientific quality; and 
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To ensure ownership of SBRI topics and technologies, the CDE utilizes a so-
called embedding process.  This embedding process works in both directions: MOD 
DSTL scientists are embedded at the Abbey Wood headquarters of the DE&S, while 
frontline users are embedded into CDE assessment teams and Abbey Wood DE&S 
managers manage SBRI projects.  Some themed calls involve uniform military on 
deployment in Afghanistan advising the technology developers and buyers.  CDE 
calls are not restricted to SMEs, although the TSB supports the awards to SMEs.   
Defense technologies funded through the CDE SBRI face three choices 
(Defence Science and Technology, n.d.-c).  First, “successful concepts which are 
relatively immature technology” may receive financial support through the MOD 
research program under the UK Defence Technology Plan (Defence Science and 
Technology, n.d.-b).  Second, “[m]ore mature technology could be considered for 
entry into the mainstream equipment program and discussed with military customers 
and the MOD’s Defense Equipment & Support organization.”  Third, “technologies 
with high immediate operational impact” can be bought on a sole-source, expedited 
basis through the Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) process.  UORs are an 
exception to the general European Union rule of competition in government 
procurement. (MOD, 2011).  The UORs process is combined equivalent to “other 
than full and open competition” under FAR Part 6.302-1, Only One Responsible 
Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements, and 
FAR 6.302-2, Unusual and Compelling Urgency.   In its effect, therefore, the UORs 
process for SBRI innovations is similar to the Phase III special acquisition 
preference, although its use is not connected per se to the contractors’ status as 
SBRI winner.   
CDE SBRI awards typically fall within the following ranges: (1) up to £30,000 
for “simple” T&E or demonstration of proof of principle; (2) up to £100,000 for “initial 
feasibility investigation or proof of concept work” with the expectation of a phased 
program including at least one review point; (3) between £100,000 and £250,000 for 
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review point; and (4) between £250,000 and £1,000,000 for a phased program of 
technology application and demonstration including several review points (Defence 
Science and Technology, n.d.-d).  The CDE notes that “[t]hese [funding] guidelines 
are not prescriptive, and we are open to proposals outside or in between the ranges 
below.” (Cooper, n.d.).    
The CDE offers four services to the industry: (1) open calls for unsolicited 
proposals; (2) themed calls; (3) seminars and workshops; and (4) so-called 
“surgeries” or proposal coaching sessions. (Almey, 2010). CDE guidance states that 
applicants 
can submit a CDE research contract proposal online—we have designed this 
process to be quick and easy. You are also welcome to come and talk to us 
at the CDE before submitting a proposal. There is a team permanently based 
at the CDE in Harwell and they are available to talk to you about your 
innovation. Once your proposal application is submitted you can track its 
progress online. Proposals can be assessed in as little as 15 days.(CDE, n.d.-
c).  
According to the CDE, 
successful applicants could benefit from:  Proof-of-concept funding in the form 
of a research contract; Support from our military scientists and engineers; 
MOD trials and testing facilities; A mentoring service ensuring a single point 
of contact within the MOD; and a unique customer insight into both UK and 
non-domestic defence markets.(Defence Suppliers Service, n.d.). 
To incentivize industry participation, the CDE employs standard contractual 
terms and conditions.  SBRI contractors generally retain intellectual property rights 
(IPR) while providing the UK MOD with the licensed use of IPR in accordance with 
the UK MOD Defence Condition (DEFCON) 705 (Defence Science and Technology, 
n.d.-a).  The CDE provides industry with the following assurances: “We consider the 
best person to exploit and develop an innovation is the inventor. . .  We will not seek, 
or are interested in an equity stake in your business.” (CDE, n.d.-b). 
The CDE undertakes a number of initiatives and incentives to further develop 
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CDE provides SBRI applicants with access to MOD trials and testing facilities (if 
applicable).  The CDE also provides mentoring and support, including technical 
advice prior to submission, assignment of “single point of contact within the MOD” 
for successful applicants, and technical support access from MOD scientists and 
engineers. (CDE, n.d.-b).  For example, the CDE is able to facilitate access of SBRI 
firms to innovation centers of major prime contractors, such as BAE Systems and 
General Dynamics.  The CDE also facilitates access of SBRI firms to Defence 
Technology Centres (DTCs).  DTCs are MOD consortia with industry and academia 
funded generally on a 50-50 basis and focused on specialized research areas 
contributing to the UK defense equipment program. 
Many of the DTCs fund 'open calls' for research proposals from outside the 
members of DTC consortium - please see the individual DTC websites for 
further information. The two way partnership allows the MOD to access 
research from industry, and industry to exploit knowledge from defence 
research.(Defense Science and Technology, n.d.-f). 
Furthermore, the CDE assists SBRI firms with obtaining security clearances. 
The CDE also undertakes to act as an internal and external advocate of SBRI 
innovation.  Specifically, the CDE staff “ensure that the right people inside MOD get 
to know of your ideas and assess their long term potential. These include military 
users, technical experts and programme managers in our Defence Equipment and 
Support (DE&S) organisation.”  (CDE, n.d.-b). Furthermore, with agreement of SBRI 
firms, the CDE “can help promote your innovation to the relevant decision-makers in 
MOD, defence prime contractors and investors.” (CDE, n.d.-b).  
CDE guidance further states that CDE exists to engage “the broadest 
possible audience of science and technology providers” including small businesses 
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 Center for Defence Enterprise SBRI One-Stop-Shop Model   Figure 20.
(Almey, 2010) 
G. The 2012 White Paper, National Security Through 
Technology, and the CDE Initiatives of the Minister for 
Defence Equipment, Support, and Technology 
In February 2012, Peter Luff, the new UK Minister for Defence Equipment, 
Support, and Technology (Min DEST), and James Brokenshire, Minister for Crime 
and Security, issued the new White Paper entitled National Security Through 
Technology.  This document created a combined military/law enforcement/homeland 
security industrial strategy for the UK.  It subordinated the defense industrial policy 
to several principles: (1) the military principles of operational advantage and freedom 
of action; (2) the economic policy principle of fostering economic growth, especially 
through innovative SMEs; and (3) the international trade objective of creating the UK 
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With regard to planning, the White Paper confirmed the commitment 
to greater openness and recognise the benefit that business gains from clarity 
of plans, especially investment priorities, . . . important, particularly for pull-
through from research into utilisation. However, we seek innovation, so the 
Government will not be specifying technology solutions. We will publish our 
defence and security priority themes annually, providing supporting strategies 
for defence and security science & technology. This will provide more clarity 
on our funded technology priorities and programmes than in previous 
published strategies and plans. In particular for defence technologies, these 
will replace the on-line Defence Technology Plan and supersede the Defence 
Technology Strategy 2006. (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 36) 
The White Paper emphasized that “[t]he organisations responsible for 
defence and security within the Government enjoy important strategic relationships 
with the Research Councils, the Technology Strategy Board, and the UK Space 
Agency, which are responsible for funding research and for innovation and 
technology development in business. These relationships facilitate access to the full 
spectrum of the UK’s technology capabilities. Mechanisms to achieve this include 
the Knowledge Transfer Networks (KTNs)—through the Aerospace, Aviation and 
Defence KTN—and the Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI), which together 
with the new network of elite Technology and Innovation Centres will ensure we 
make full use of technologies developed for civilian applications and invest in the 
development of defence and security uses for them” (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 
38–39). 
The White Paper placed extensive emphasis on SMEs.   It noted that “SMEs 
are a vital source of innovation and flexibility in meeting defence and security 
requirements . . . [and] are hugely important to the UK economy.”  (Luff & 
Brokenshire, 2012, p. 55).  The ministers affirmed their determination “to increase 
SMEs’ share of public procurement, and have an aspiration that 25% by value of 
Government contracts should benefit small businesses, including in supply chains” 
and reported that “[i]n the year to March 2011, an estimated 42% of MOD contracts 
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value.” (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 56).  The White Paper noted a variety of pro-
SME measures, including 
appointment of a ‘Crown Representative’ for SMEs to build a more strategic 
dialogue and launch SME ‘Product Surgeries’ to enable selected companies 
to ‘pitch’ innovative products and services, and coordination of departmental 
action plans to help achieve our aspiration for 25% of contracts to be placed 
with SMEs. (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 56).  
The White Paper also noted a variety of procurement simplification measures, 
“a dedicated SME group in the new Defence Suppliers Forum, chaired by a MOD 
Minister, to provide a better ‘voice’ for small suppliers,” and greater IP protections 
through a “revised . . . approach to enable the submission of tenders in a way which 
helps protect the tenderer’s innovative proposals.”  (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 56).  
The White Paper extensively addressed the CDE SBRI.  It dubbed the CDE 
a gateway between the outside world and the MOD for anyone with a 
disruptive technology, new process, or innovation that has a potential defence 
application.   It brings together innovation and investment for the defence 
market, ensuring that our front-line forces have the best battle-winning 
technologies for the future. (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 39). 
The White Paper also noted greater involvement of CDE and SBRI in support 
of homeland security/counter-terrorism priorities.  With regards to the CDE SBRI, the 
White Paper noted that the CDE 
remains our first point of contact for anyone who wishes to submit a research 
idea to the MOD. . . . Building on CDE’s success in providing efficient access 
to innovation, we will broaden its remit to cover both the defence and security 
domains. (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012, p. 39)  
Specifically, the White Paper promised that 
we will seek ways for CDE to provide more support to small and medium-
sized enterprises in understanding how MOD operates, the development of 
routes to market for potential defence and security products, and to enhance 
exploitation mechanisms between CDE and our suppliers. (Luff & 
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The White Paper also noted that it wants to draw in the expertise of non-traditional 
contractors on government-funded and independent R&D, 
not just in large specialist defence and security firms, but in small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and universities too. Both enhancement of CDE 
and the role of DSTL in formulating and delivering the MOD’s science & 
technology programme will be critical to achieving this. (Luff & Brokenshire, 
2012, p. 40)   
H. The 2012 Min DEST Reforms: An Expanded Role for SBRI 
and the CDE 
In March 2012, Min DEST Peter Luff visited the CDE and made a major policy 
announcement concerning SBRI and the CDE (Luff & Brokenshire, 2012).  For 
context of this announcement, Table 3 provides an up-to-date chronology of SBRI 
reforms. Min DEST Luff noted that the CDE continues to fulfill its three-fold mission: 
(1) to provide visibility of the MOD’s requirements; (2) to inform and support new 
supply networks; and (3) to widen the MOD’s supplier base (Luff & Brokenshire, 
2012).  He further noted that, as of March 2012, the CDE received over 3,000 
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Table 3. UK Defense SBRI Major Milestones 
UK Defense SBRI:                                                          
Major Milestones 
Year Agency/Leader/Organization Action/Reform 
2001 UK Government SBRI created as a single-phase program 
with awards up to funded  with a voluntary 
2.5 set-aside target of agency R&D funds 
2004 Industry and academia, 
especially David Connell of 
Cambridge University 
SBRI reform campaign commenced 
March 2005 UK House of Commons Private members’ legislation 
March 2005 UK Government SBRI 2.5 percent set-aside target 
established as a mandate 
December 
2005 
UK Ministry of Defence 
(including Lord Drayson) 




Lord David Sainsbury Lord Sainsbury Review published 
March 2008 UK Department of Business, 
Innovation, and Skills 
Implementation Report 
May 2008 Lord Drayson, Minister for 
Defense Equipment and 
Support (Min DES) 
Center for Defense Enterprise established 
and commences SBRI awards 
April 2009 UK DBIS SBRI program re-introduced as a two-
phase program co-funded by TSB and 
buying agencies designed to solve agency 
mission challenges  
May 2010 Prime Minister David 
Cameron and the UK 
Coalition Government 
Coalition government formed with the plan 
to introduce an “aspirational” target of 
awarding SMEs 25% of government 
procurement contracts  
June 2010 National Endowment for 
Science, Technology, and 
the Arts (NESTA) 
Buying Power? Is the SBRI for  Procuring 
R&D Driving  Innovation in the UK? report 
published 
June 2010 EU Commission, Directorate 
General of Enterprise and 
Industry, Pro Inno Europe 
Peer Review of SBRI pilot report published 
February 
2012 
Peter Luff, Minister for 
Defence Equipment, 
Support, and 
Technology(Min DEST), and 
James Brokenshire, Minister 
for Crime and Security 
National Security Through Technology 
White Paper published (replaced the 2005 
Defence Industrial Strategy) 
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On the policy side, Min DEST Luff (2012) reaffirmed the call of the National 
Security Through Technology White Paper to “enhance the role of the CDE, such 
that it works more closely with the SMEs that it funds, including the facilitation of 
opportunities to engage with prime contractors to increase the likelihood of 
exploitation of the most innovative outputs.”  The Min DEST explained that 
This means taking CDE to the next level . . . [i]n broadening the reach of CDE 
to address both defence and security markets, as well as deepening its 
support to new entrants into the defence.   Or, in the words of the White 
Paper ‘enhancing exploitation mechanisms between CDE and our suppliers.’  
We will do this with an active focus on SMEs, and on implementing an active 
‘SME friendly’ engagement programme.   (Luff, 2012). 
The Min DEST then announced a detailed, three-part CDE SME initiative 
where “CDE will be focusing much more clearly on SMEs in its future work.”  The 
first part of the CDE SME initiative consists of continuing “CDE’s role as an entry 
point to Defence” and “another function - as a bridge linking the SMEs and the main 
defence suppliers, as well as investors and wider Government.”  (Luff, 2012). The 
CDE will be “facilitating networks” and “launching a series of market place events . . . 
designed for SMEs to showcase their project outputs to Defence Primes; the venture 
capital investment community and innovation initiatives across government within 
other government departments such as the Technology Strategy Board.”  (Luff, 
2012). The second part of the CDE SME initiative 
will be the introduction of nine new ‘Open Engagement’ events to increase 
awareness of opportunities within the Defence research and development 
market.  Some of these will be working jointly with industry bodies and 
knowledge transfer networks, as well as specific industry sectors—such as 
Transport and Healthcare.  (Luff, 2012).  
The goal of this part is to encourage deployment of dual-use technologies.  The third 
part of the CDE SME initiative “will involve CDE mentoring SMEs - in order to guide 
and help their approach to maximise opportunities for exploitation.  CDE will be a 
promoter - giving SMEs the opportunity to present their innovations to leading 
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With regard to technology transition, the Min DEST arranged for the 
assignment of approximately four additional staff members within both the CDE and 
the DE&S each toward “helping CDE’s clients access the acquisition programmes of 
MoD much more effectively.”  (Luff, 2012). These additional personnel shall serve as 
“the Sherpas who help make good ideas real, . . . ensure CDE’s clients can reach 
the summit of their ambition,  . . . [and] so help solve more of MoD’s equipment 
challenges.”   (Luff, 2012). At the same time, the Min DEST emphasized his 
commitment to maintain the CDE’s strength of “fleetness of foot, born of a small, 
unbureaucratic structure.” (Luff, 2012). 
The new CDE SME initiative involves additional funding.  Previously, CDE 
SBRI Phase 1 awards were funded by a mix which included MOD DSTL funding and 
“up to £1.5 million a year” in TSB SBRI funding, while Phase 2 and subsequent 
awards were funded solely from MOD funds. (Luff, 2012). Under the terms of this 
new initiative, the TSB stepped in with additional funding of up to £2 million a year 
toward CDE SBRI Phase 2 projects.    
At the same time, the Min DEST announced an effort with DBIS to help SME 
proposals that do not have clear military applications for further civilian uses in 
government or industry.   
Finally, at the request of large and small businesses, the Min DEST also 
announced greater transparency in CDE event programs as well as the CDE SBRI 
contract awards.  These measures include an online program of events with six 
months of advance notice as well as future online publication of SBRI contract 
awards.   
I. Lessons from the UK SBRI Experience 
The UK experience with SBRI offers policy-makers in the U.S. with several 
important lessons for the SBIR and STTR programs, including CPP/CRP.  First, the 
TSB model of supplementing agency funds provides a real incentive for government 
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offers a real alternative to the complicated, complex maze of technology transition 
assistance programs within the DoD.  However, the U.S. SBIR program 
compensates for complexity with transparency of rules and selection criteria.   The 
UK SBRI also provides for stronger mentoring opportunities through proposal 
“surgeries.”  In the U.S., these services are typically provided by the Procurement 
Technical Assistance Centers.  Most important, the UK model offers real ownership 
of SBRI topics by the buying agencies and user evaluations.  In contrast, the U.S. 
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VIII. Recommendations for CPP Reforms 
Based on the examination of Section 252 (NDAA, 2006) legislative text, 
SBIR-related proceedings of the National Academies of Sciences Symposium, the 
Congressional Guidance Letter on Section 252, best practices available 
internationally, and the DoD-wide survey of SBIR and STTR managers, we make the 
following recommendations for action by the Secretaries of Defense and the military 
departments and, where appropriate, by Congress. 
A. Create a Streamlined One-Stop-Shop Process for 
Assisting SBIR/STTR Firms With Technology Transition, 
Including Development, Testing & Evaluation, and 
Procurement 
It is clear from research reported in this paper that one of the main obstacles 
to successful technology transition in the DoD is confusion and lack of information 
on available assistance programs within government managers and small 
businesses/industry alike.  This confusion and lack of information forces small firms 
to spend much time navigating the DoD bureaucracy for technology funding sources 
and introduces uncertainty that discourages acquisition program managers and 
program executive officers from planning for insertion of technologies developed  by 
small firms.  A streamlined one-stop-shop process for SBIR/STTR firms set up within 
each military department and/or within the Office of the Secretary of Defense could 
reduce bureaucratic barriers for small firms and interested program managers and 
program executive officers.  If an SBIR/STTR technology looks promising but would 
require planned and/or targeted assistance with development, testing, or evaluation, 
the one-stop shop could help tailor the appropriate funding mechanisms and assist 
with technology road mapping, leading to procurement by the DoD under contracts 
or by major prime contractors under subcontracts.  The one-stop shop could reduce 
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including venture capitalists, to act as gatekeepers for Phase III procurements and 
as intermediaries between defense acquisition programs and SBIR firms. 
B. Raise Military Department Acquisition Community 
Sponsorship of SBIR/STTR Topics From at Least 50% to at 
Least 75%, Seek Prime Contracts’ Recommendations of 
Topics for Military Department Acquisition Community 
Sponsorship, and Publicly Designate the Existence of 
Sponsorship in the Solicitation 
As our study confirms, the key technology transition best practice in the 
United Kingdom and the United States is market pull for the technology at issue that 
occurs when the technology addresses an identified need of a defense acquisition 
program.  For this reason, the UK CDE does not fund SBRI topical competitions 
unless the topics are requested by the Defence Equipment & Supply organization 
(even when SBRI topics end up receiving additional technology development 
funding and not acquisition program funding at the conclusion of SBRI contract 
performance).  Likewise, NASA has attempted to fundamentally reform its 
SBIR/STTR programs by ensuring that all of its SBIR/STTR topics meet identifiable 
acquisition needs.  In contrast, the DoD has never gone above its 50% topic 
sponsorship policy.  Although there is a need for some SBIR/STTR topics that will 
further the long-term research interests of the DoD (e.g., DARPA topics and topics 
addressing the needs of military department R&D communities), it is clear that the 
majority of SBIR/STTR topics must have DoD acquisition program sponsorship.  
Raising the DoD sponsorship policy from 50% of SBIR/STTR topics to at least 75% 
of topics, seeking SBIR/STTR topic recommendations from major prime contractors 
for military departments’ acquisition community sponsorship, and requiring a public 
designator of topic sponsors in the R&D or acquisition communities as part of 
SBIR/STTR solicitations should address any disconnect between the SBIR/STTR 
solicitations and the needs of defense acquisition programs.  It should also provide 
clearer notice to small firms concerning the possibility of any future procurement 
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C. Confirm the Overall Authority of Military Department 
Offices of Small Business Programs, Small Business 
Specialists, and Small Business Technical Advisers Over 
SBIR/STTR Transition Assistance and Incentives 
Our study’s findings show that a major part of the DoD SBIR 
Commercialization Pilot Program, as implemented by the military departments, 
involved contracting for consultants, including venture capitalists and technical 
assistance vendors, to serve as “transition agents” and evaluators of SBIR firms 
seeking Phase III contracts or enhancements to Phase II contracts.  These private 
advisory contractors essentially act as source selection “gatekeepers” for Phase III 
procurements (e.g., by pre-selecting candidates presented to Army acquisition 
program managers for Army CPP funding and procurement assistance, thereby 
making initial eligibility and responsibility determinations) or as intermediaries 
between defense acquisition programs and SBIR firms (e.g., within the Air Force and 
the Navy). 
However, the current CPP approach duplicates existing responsibilities of 
OSD agency and military department Directors of Offices of Small Business 
Programs (OSBP), as well as their small business specialist and small business 
technical advisers embedded in buying commands and activities.  The OSBP 
directors and their small business acquisition workforce oversees and advocates for 
an increase in small business prime contracting and subcontracting participation 
under the existing legal and regulatory framework, such as 15 U.S.C. § 644(k), FAR 
19.201, DFARS 219.201, and DFARS PGI 219.201.  The current CPP approach 
also ignores the recommendations of the National Academies of Sciences to support 
SBIR Phase III efforts by using existing incentives for subcontracting with small 
firms.  The Phase III Commercialization Symposium highlighted the experience of 
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Therefore, it is recommended that overall authority for CPP activities be 
conferred in the military department and OSD agencies’ OSBPs and that small 
business specialists and technical advisers be funded and encouraged to conduct 
outreach to program managers/program executive offices and prime contractors, 
engage in SBIR technology road map development, facilitate inclusion of 
SBIR/STTR technology transition goals into prime contractors’ subcontracting plans, 
and facilitate T&E funding assistance to small firms as well as subcontracting 
incentives for large prime contractors. 
D. Realign the Commercialization Pilot Program to Facilitate 
Pull of Technologies Into Defense Acquisition Through 
Secretarial Instructions That Clearly Define Criteria for High 
Military Priority of SBIR Projects as Well as 
Commercialization Pilot Program Eligibility and 
Responsibility of SBIR Firms in Each DoD Agency and 
Military Department 
The essence of the CPP structure is to realign the DoD SBIR technology 
acquisition process from a “push” by SBIR firms trying to convince the DoD to 
purchase their products and services to a pull of SBIR technologies by DoD 
acquisition programs (both at the government and the prime contractor level).  This 
realignment is necessary to reverse the attitude inside the DoD that SBIR set-asides 
are a “tax” against mission-focused DoD acquisition and RDT&E funds.  The study 
indicates that CPP eligibility criteria are not well defined by the DoD and the military 
departments.  They appear to be left to the discretion of the CPP contractors, 
including private venture capitalists.  Thus, the focus of evaluation shifts to whether 
an SBIR firm has already developed on its own a profitable government acquisition 
market, not whether the technology is a priority for the DoD or a military department 
and one or more of its acquisition program executive officers or program managers. 
Moreover, the current poorly defined CPP eligibility criteria appear to violate 
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Certificates of Competency.  Under the Small Business Act, government contracting 
officers are not allowed to deny small businesses the awards of any contracts for 
perceived lack of any “elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to 
capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, and 
tenacity...without referring the matter for final disposition” and a Certificate of 
Competency to the Small Business Administration (15 U.S.C. 637(b)(7)(A), 2011).  
Phase III contracts to SBIR firms are not excluded from this requirement for a CPP 
determination.  
Secretarial instructions should clearly provide for (1) secretarial certifications 
of high military priority for SBIR technologies before such technologies are selected 
for the CPP and (2) a process for evaluation of SBIR firms’ business, financial, and 
manufacturing capabilities that may provide for assessment by business 
development contractors as well as appeal to the SBA for a Certificate of 
Competency. 
E. Publish Results of Quadrennial Strategic Reviews 
Concerning SBIR/STTR Topic Alignment With DoD R&D Plans 
and Program Manager/Program Executive Officer Inputs 
Our study suggests that few SBIR/STTR agencies have conducted the 
periodic Quadrennial SBIR/STTR topics review.  This review has the potential to 
improve the usefulness of SBIR/STTR set-asides and encourage greater Phase III 
awards by aligning SBIR/STTR focus areas with DoD R&D Plans (e.g., the Defense 
Technology Area Plan, Basic Research Plan, and Joint Warfighting Science and 
Technology Plan) as well as acquisition programs’ inputs and the DoD Quadrennial 
Defense Review.   
The OSD and military departments should conduct such a review and publish 
its results. 
F. Expand the Commercialization Pilot Program to the STTR 
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and Evaluation Facilities, Including Naval Warfare Centers 
and DoD Academic Institutions, Such as the Naval 
Postgraduate School 
To the extent that SBIR and STTR technologies suffer from the risk of 
insufficient testing, one major incentive would involve greater access of SBIR and 
STTR firms to military testing facilities and funding for T&E at these facilities.  Such 
facilities would include the elements of the Naval Warfare Centers Enterprise such 
as the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, as 
well as military postsecondary academic institutions such as the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the Air Force Institute of Technology, and the military Service academies.   
Specifically, the Small Business Act should be amended to (1) provide for 
eligibility of the military postsecondary academic institutions to participate in the 
STTR program on the same terms as federally funded research and development 
centers (FFRDCs) and (2) confirm the ability of SBIR and STTR CPP firms to use 
CPP assistance for T&E activities at military T&E facilities and military 
postsecondary academic institutions. 
G. Expressly Describe Authorized Acquisition Incentives and 
Other Types of Incentives in Commercialization Pilot 
Program Legislation 
It seems clear from the study that the DoD and military department SBIR and 
STTR managers do not fully comprehend the full range of incentives that are 
authorized under the CPP.  This appears to be due to lack of awareness of the 
Congressional Guidance Letter and the proceedings of the SBIR Phase III 
Symposium at the National Academy of Sciences.   As a result, the DoD and military 
departments have focused on hiring business advisory and assistance contractors to 
conduct business evaluations, outreach, and advocacy of small firms.  Education 
and business development incentives are only one category of incentives among 
seven possible types of incentives listed in the Congressional Guidance Letter.  
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the military departments should spell out all such incentives in their FAR 
supplements. 
H. Establish Clear Policies Concerning Technical Assistance 
Vendors’ Investment in SBIR/STTR Firms, Organizational 
Conflicts of Interest, and Performance by Such Vendors of 
Inherently Governmental Functions 
The current CPP model appears to provide insufficient assurances against 
organizational conflicts of interest (OCIs) and performance of inherently government 
functions (IGF) by government contractors.  Specifically, there is a potential for 
venture capital contractors to recommend for Phase III those SBIR firms that are 
open to future venture capital investments by the recommenders.  There is also a 
potential for business advisory and assistance contractors to recommend only firms 
that utilize their business development assistance services authorized under 15 
U.S.C. 638(q), Discretionary Technical Assistance, which allows SBIR and STTR 
agencies to contract with vendors for advisory services for individual SBIR and 
STTR awardees where the awardees will use part of their SBIR and STTR awards to 
pay for such advisory services.   Under FAR 9.505 (2011), contracting officers must 
structure acquisitions with the goal of “preventing the existence of conflicting roles 
that might bias a contractor’s judgment...[and] unfair competitive advantage.”  Under 
FAR 9.504 (2011), the contracting officer issuing a solicitation (or any solicitation-
type CPP invitation for future Phase III or Phase II Enhancement awards) must 
recommend a plan to the head of contracting activity for resolving any significant 
potential conflicts of interest.  Moreover, under the FAR, Congress, the OSD, and 
the military departments should absolutely and unequivocally prohibit contractors 
that are or may be involved in advising or investments to SBIR or STTR firms from 
participating as advisors on CPP evaluation (including any Phase II enhancements 
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